Daniel Dennett on Free Will

By Daniel Miessler on October 6th, 2009: Tagged as Philosophy | Science
  • CarlM

    Not to beat a dead horse (Daniel and I have been discussing this lately and he's heard this already), but if quantum mechanics is true, then we can't (even in principle) know everything about the state of the universe. So, absolute predictions of the future are not allowed (even in principle) by physics as we understand it today. This doesn't suggest that quantum mechanics gives us a opening into which we can insert our will, but it does mean that the deterministic argument against free will doesn't work in the form that it is usually presented (such as the way the interviewer does at the start of the clip). (It was probably wise of Dennett not to get distracted by this since it's not relevant to his point.)

    I think that this clip makes clear that many of the arguments about free-will are semantic. There's a saying about ducks … and I especially like the Douglas Adams version (which is not as absolute as the standard version .. and adds a bit of humor as well). “If it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, we have at least to consider the possibility that we have a small aquatic bird of the family anatidae on our hands.” This summarizes my own position on free will rather nicely.

    If by the volitional exertion of a bit of willpower, we are able to fight an urge or to make a decision that would not otherwise have been made, then it seems to me that the stench of free will is in the air. (I know, Daniel, illusions can have a pretty convincing stench sometimes too.)

  • Dan

    CarlM wrote: “So, absolute predictions of the future are not allowed (even in principle) by physics as we understand it today”

    The key here is whether quantum physics provides a complete and accurate view of reality, or simply our current best approximation at the smallest scale. For reasons I won't go into, I happen to beleive the latter. In that case a complete knowledge of physics (that we clearly do not yet possess) would allow us, in principle, to have an absolute prediction of the future.

    But I think the quantum physics discussion is a distraction. Whether the rules of the universe are known or not, the regularity in which mass and energy interact in the universe requires that any future state be the result of the current state. In other words, the future is inevitable. Or if you prefer, the future can be no other way.

    Dennett's argument that conscious avoiders can change the future does not stand because any decision (such as avoiding the spear) is the result of a mental and physical process that are themselves governed by the same laws of physics. Dennett seems to argue that the mental processes of the avoiders are outside the confines of physics, which is simply not true.

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    Keep in mind that Dennett is a determinist, too. The difference is that he's a compatibalist whereas you and I are incompatablists.

  • CarlM

    Two (minor) points:

    (1) You say “In that case a complete knowledge of physics (that we clearly do not yet possess) would allow us, in principle, to have an absolute prediction of the future.”

    I'd say that it is EXTREMELY likely that quantum physics is “only” our current best approximation at the smallest scale, but I think that if this is the case, it only follows that a complete knowledge of physics MIGHT allow us, in principle, to have an absolute prediction of the future. The point is that even if quantum physics is “only” an approximation and something else is going on behind the scenes, it doesn't follow that this behind the scenes stuff is deterministic in the way you suggest.

    (2) You say “Whether the rules of the universe are known or not, the regularity in which mass and energy interact in the universe requires that any future state be the result of the current state. In other words, the future is inevitable. Or if you prefer, the future can be no other way.”

    If quantum physics IS correct, then this is partially wrong. While it's true that even quantum mechanics says (more or less) that future states of the universe are the result of the current state, it absolutely does NOT say that the future is inevitable. The theory gives probabilities of what the immediate future will look like (from which you could, perhaps, in principle, deduce what the near and then distant future might look like .. though at some stage, the vast number of quantum systems all interacting with one another would make prediction even in principle rather problematic). Anyway, the point is that quantum physics does not say (doesn't even come CLOSE to saying) that “the future can be no other way”. (Whether it allows for something that Daniel would consider free will is an entirely separate question from what I'm responding to here.)

  • CarlM

    Two (minor) points:

    (1) You say “In that case a complete knowledge of physics (that we clearly do not yet possess) would allow us, in principle, to have an absolute prediction of the future.”

    I'd say that it is EXTREMELY likely that quantum physics is “only” our current best approximation at the smallest scale, but I think that if this is the case, it only follows that a complete knowledge of physics MIGHT allow us, in principle, to have an absolute prediction of the future. The point is that even if quantum physics is “only” an approximation and something else is going on behind the scenes, it doesn't follow that this behind the scenes stuff is deterministic in the way you suggest.

    (2) You say “Whether the rules of the universe are known or not, the regularity in which mass and energy interact in the universe requires that any future state be the result of the current state. In other words, the future is inevitable. Or if you prefer, the future can be no other way.”

    If quantum physics IS correct, then this is partially wrong. While it's true that even quantum mechanics says (more or less) that future states of the universe are the result of the current state, it absolutely does NOT say that the future is inevitable. The theory gives probabilities of what the immediate future will look like (from which you could, perhaps, in principle, deduce what the near and then distant future might look like .. though at some stage, the vast number of quantum systems all interacting with one another would make prediction even in principle rather problematic). Anyway, the point is that quantum physics does not say (doesn't even come CLOSE to saying) that “the future can be no other way”. (Whether it allows for something that Daniel would consider free will is an entirely separate question from what I'm responding to here.)

  • Skepticdave

    I guess I have a question. Your analogy about the machines sensing their environment has struck me as an interesting one. I am assuming here that you are comparing humanity’s biological “machinery” to manmade machinery; thus I wonder if you are correct in your analogy. For instance, I can sense my internal environment and determine if I am hungry, and in doing so I can decide to eat or not to eat. While it would be irrational for me to not eat, I can choose not to do so. The question then is is this not an act of freewill? Or would you argue that there is some other force making my brain entertain the notion of not eating?

  • http://www.facebook.com/ericdavidribner Eric David Ribner

    As much as I enjoyed Dennett’s book on this (Freedom Evolves), it doesn’t really answer (though it tries) my biggest objection to this: what difference does it make even if HAVE the freedom to choose what I do, if the genes that make human beings (and every other animal) pretty much preprogrammed what I will WANT to do. I’m able to choose a path (means) to an end that I DID NOT CHOOSE. I can’t decide what will make me happy, what I like to eat, what features of the opposite sex attract me, what kinds of work I enjoy doing (even though to some extent I can choose the nature of the work I actually do), and so on, essentially ad infinitum. I am hard pressed to think of anything about the core nature of who I am that actually is the way it is BECAUSE of a choice that I’ve made. All of my choices are about the pursuit of what my drives impel me towards, but I have no control of the nature or content of these drives at all. This doesn’t seem to me to be a variety of free will worth wanting, no matter how Dennett tries to make it seem like one.


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