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	<title>danielmiessler.com &#187; Vulnerability Management</title>
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		<title>Vulnerability Management Without Asset Management, Isn&#8217;t</title>
		<link>http://danielmiessler.com/blog/vulnerability-management-without-asset-management-isnt</link>
		<comments>http://danielmiessler.com/blog/vulnerability-management-without-asset-management-isnt#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2007 04:23:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Daniel Miessler</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vulnerability Assessment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vulnerability Management]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[I&#8217;ve been doing some work for a client recently in the realm of vulnerability management. It&#8217;s an interesting area of information security because it draws on so many disciplines. The single biggest thing I&#8217;ve learned about this problem is the criticality of asset management. Quite simply, you can&#8217;t hope to &#8220;manage&#8221; what you don&#8217;t know [...]]]></description>
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<p>I&#8217;ve been doing some work for a client recently in the realm of vulnerability management. It&#8217;s an interesting area of information security because it draws on so many disciplines. The single biggest thing I&#8217;ve learned about this problem is the criticality of asset management.</p>

<p>Quite simply, you can&#8217;t hope to &#8220;manage&#8221; what you don&#8217;t know about. What I&#8217;d specifically like to see is a move toward security scanners that leverage rich data about an organization&#8217;s assets. I know of one product doing this (largely unsucessfully), but I&#8217;d like to see it become common in the space.</p>

<p>Here are a few things that asset management offers us:</p>

<ul>
    <li>Show me all Vista systems that are vulnerable to MS08-001 that are in my building.</li>
    <li>Find all Solaris boxes in our Indiana offices that have SSH enabled, as of yesterday.</li>
    <li>Make me a report of all systems running Telnet that Bob Smith manages.</li>
</ul>

<p>And if we factor in other rich, user-added security data into the database, such as &#8220;importance&#8221;, &#8220;exposure&#8221;, or &#8220;risk&#8221;, we could say:</p>

<ul>
    <li>Display all high-risk systems in North America that run Windows Vista or XP, but don&#8217;t have HIPS installed.</li>
    <li>List all webservers running Apache 1.3.x in our Wyoming offices that are exposed to the Internet but aren&#8217;t running SELinux.</li>
</ul>

<p>Then add to that the ability to run scans off of those queries. An information loop from the asset-management database to the security scanner, and then (potentially) back into the asset-database. This is how I think we should be moving forward &#8212; gathering as much information as possible on what you are protecting, and use that information to improve the quality of your security testing.</p>

<p>Thoughts?</p>
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