In my ongoing efforts to convince others that free will is an illusion, I have found an argument vector that I’ve not yet encountered:

If you believe in cause and effect, i.e. that all outcomes are the result of previous conditions, and you accept that all causes existed before you were born, then it impossible to believe that any choice you can make is truly free.

Think about that. How could one make a free choice in a cause and effect world if every factor that determined the outcome of your choice existed before you were born? To believe that is to believe in magic.

Let’s try it in deductive form:

1. The universe is governed by cause and effect.
2. The physical components of all possible causes existed before you were born.
3. Any outcome must be the result of those causes and those causes alone.
4. Therefore the proposition of human authorship of outcomes must be false.

I welcome challenges to the logic and/or help with formalizing it.

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This is the single best presentation of Harris’ argument that I’ve ever seen him make. He finally addresses common counterarguments, such as:

Well, I can decide to do x right now—and then I can change my mind–or even change my mind again! This proves I have free will.

This is the first time I’ve seen Harris address this line of argument directly. He also goes into the significant and positive repercussions of seeing the world this way.

I honestly see this video as one of the most important things one can do with an hour. We’re talking about nothing less than realizing that 99% of the world is fundamentally confused about the nature of reality.

Accepting the narrative put forward by Harris here is akin to waking from a sleep for the first time. This applies to how we see ourselves as people, how we are connected to others, and why we should be build a society that reflects this perspective.

Please. Watch this in its entirety. It might, without hyperbole, literally change your life.

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Sam Harris’s book on free will came out today and I read it during dinner (it’s a short read). Here’s what I had to say about the book back in December when he announced it:

I basically anticipate an extremely high-quality summary of my numerous articles, posts, and debate interactions on this topic.

Without arrogance or humility I can only say that I called it exactly as it fell: http://danielmiessler.com/blog/sam-harris-free-will-book-coming-in-february

That aside, I’ve been having a long-running email debate on the topic with two friends, and I found it to have a number of areas where it advanced the discussion. For example, I found the fact that he precisely identified and referenced the nature of his disagreement with Dennett (the current compatibilist flag-bearer) to be highly significant. I also thought that he had a few n-liners that were particularly strong, such as:

Why didn’t I decide to drink a glass of juice (rather than water). The thought never occurred to me. Am I free to do that which does not occur to me to do? Of course not. And there is no way I can influence my desires–for what tools of influence would I use? Other desires? To say that I would have done otherwise had I wanted to is simply to say that I would have been in a different universe had I lived in a different universe.

Brilliant.

Interestingly, there is also a remote chance that my influence on Harris actually affected the text, as the link I sent him (which he loved and tweeted out) was the two-lever argument you guys are so tired of familiar with. Anyway, something strikingly similar/familiar made it into his text:

What I will do next, and why, remains, at bottom, a mystery–one that is fully determined by the prior state of the universe and the laws of nature (including the contributions of chance).

Sound familiar? It’s like I wrote it! — down to the addition of chance as one of the laws, which appeared in the version of the text I sent him.

I obviously don’t mean to say that he stole it; creators often confuse sources while contemplating a topic, and the argument is quite similar to others before it, but I do find it interesting that this is the same exact argument that I sent to both him and Galen Strawson (who also approved of it).

Anyway, enough of my celebration and delusions of significance. I will simply say that I was not surprised at all by his arguments (or how well presented they were). I actually find them to be so strong as to be obvious. I will fully admit, however, that this conviction is reaching the point of being vulnerable to confirmation bias, so I’m trying to keep that in check.

TL;DR: Bought it. Read it. Loved it. Exactly what I expected.

I answered this recently in an email, and here’s the response:

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>On Sun, Feb 26, 2012 at 5:10 AM, JM wrote:

–snip–

He (Same Harris) also says: “Happily, we will find that we need no illusions about a person’s place in the causal order to hold him accountable for his actions, or to take actions ourselves.” So Sam Harris also disagrees with you. As far as I remember, he elaborated in this in “The Moral Landscape” (I can’t find the book, nor his blog posts about it on the internet right now). Let’s see what he says in “Free Will”. :-)

My opinion (which probably has been influenced by Sam Harris), is that we are not actually responsible for crime, for example, but it is a good idea for society to assign responsibility, because this amounts to a positive environmental influence (we will be less likely to do the crime if we feel responsible and/or there are consequences in the form of prison). So we get moral responsibility because society decides to assign it. We can call it “assigned (moral) responsibility”. We agree that it’s not actual responsibility, but it’s still a good concept for the society.

Agree or disagree?

Hi JM,

Yes, I do agree. My stance on this has always been that we should intellectually acknowledge that free will (and therefore moral responsibility) is an illusion, but that we should mostly function as if it were real.

This means making decisions as if you had true choice, and it means “holding people responsible” for their actions in most practical situations.

But it means that when it comes to designing a society’s criminal justice system, and system of taxation, and philosophy on welfare, and structure of public education, etc. — all these things are done with the knowledge that inputs create outputs, i.e. no free will exists, and that nobody “deserves” to be rich or poor.

In other words, I advocate a clear duality in our treatment of the matter. We functionally behave as if we have free will because consequentialism still yields fruit based on incentivizing good and bad behavior, but at an intellectual level we understand that this is in place for practical reasons rather than absolute.

TL;DR: Embrace the duality of behaving as if you have it while knowing you don’t. Do this because it’s the only way we as humans can function practically while remaining intellectually honest.

Before going into my qualms with Daniel Dennett’s capability/evitibility-based free will, I want to point out that most supporters of Daniel Dennett’s brand of free will don’t realize that he agrees that we don’t have my brand of free will. What brand is that you ask? The absolute kind. The kind where people are free to step outside of a deterministic world and do something other than what follows from the inputs (which they don’t control).

Dennett knows this is impossible. The image above is from a talk he did in Edinburgh where he was very clear about this. He accepts the world to be effectively deterministic (meaning we gain no freedom from quantum randomness) and he has an elegant way of illustrating it through the slide below.

Here he cleanly captures the fact that the main type of free will that people have been talking about for centuries is simply not real, and goes on to say that the one that is real–the one we experience each day–is actually not real. He even goes on to say in the lecture that, “the fake stuff is actually pretty good”, or something to that effect.

So that’s one point: that he’s agreeing with we incompatibilists on our type of free will. But that’s not the part that bothers me. What bothers me is his claim that his species of free will is useful in some way that matters, i.e. from a blame and praise standpoint. To state this another way, if he accepts that the universe is deterministic, and that all outcomes are the result of inputs and laws, then I fail to see how he makes room for moral responsibility.

In my view, his talk of evolutionary biology, competence, evitability, and future creation are all handwaving. Surely these things are true, and surely we’re more evolved in these ways than other animals, but he fails to explain how they provide an escape from physics.

These things ride on top of physics–not below. They are products of it. They are outcomes. And once he has accepted that the physics itself is determined then he must know that all actions we make are determined as well. And he does know this. In fact he embraces it — that’s why he’s a compatibilist.

How then does he salvage moral responsibility from this? Let’s assume one being is more or less “capable” to predict future, or to make a proper decision. He claims this will determine its ability to avoid things, and thus as we evolve we get better at doing so.

Great. Well done. So what?

One’s capabilities are a function of inputs that he did not control. One’s ability to predict future is precisely the same. None of the components that make up the agent were in the control of the agent. So when a decision is made using one’s “capabilities” they are simply doing what they can with with what they have.

Someone. Anyone. Please explain to me how we get moral responsibility from this. I simply cannot see how he could conjure that interpretation.

I throw myself at the feet of the Internet. Show me what I’m missing.

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via samharris.org

Naturally, I am fairly silly with anticipation for this book. Sadly it’s for pretty poor reasons, as I think he’s going to mirror my exact position — albeit with much more time spent on his arguments and better prose.

I do look forward to having some additional support for my position, though. He’ll spend time gathering data to support his arguments, which I do only in the form of a link to this or that.

I basically anticipate an extremely high-quality summary of my numerous articles, posts, and debate interactions on this topic.

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The author succeeds in bringing life back to the debate, but he doesn’t make any new progress. The issue, as a few commenters have touched on, is much simpler than it appears from all this handwaving.

Quite simply, somebody explain how a choice can be free if one doesn’t control the inputs to the choice. I capture this in a semi-formal argument here: http://danielmiessler.com/arguments/free_will/two_lever_argument/

Some, like Dennett, agree that we don’t have the free will described in that argument but say it doesn’t matter because we can do things like choose menu items at a restaurant, or dodge spears in the jungle. I agree, of course, and that’s all very nice, but it shouldn’t be confused with true choice.

I attempt to clearly define the difference between the two here: http://danielmiessler.com/blog/absolute-vs-practical-free-will

For those who don’t wish to follow links within comments (understandable, but regrettable) practical free will lets us make choices from within our confines of not controlling the inputs to our decisions. We don’t control our physical makeup, and we don’t have full control of our environment — hence, in order to show that we have TRUE choice we must show that we can choose OUTSIDE of those influences.

This to me requires one of two things: either 1) a completely new way of looking at how the universe works, or 2) the supernatural. I simply reject both until I see evidence, and I am stunned this isn’t the default and obvious position for anyone considering themselves to be skeptical and scientifically literate.

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Many believe the discussion of free will is pointless. This is usually because one believes it’s been settled (for the religious who believe God gave it to us) or because one believes it doesn’t matter (for the secular types who believe there is no practical benefit to having the discussion).

I will attempt to convince the second group that their position of apathy is incorrect.

The Concept of “Deserving”

It’s impossible to deserve anything unless there is free will. If there is no free will then nobody deserves praise for becoming rich after years of hard work. Similarly, nobody deserves to be looked down upon for failing to succeed in life.

It is nearly impossible to overstate how important this point is.

It’s true that even those who do believe in free will give room for difficult circumstances, but ultimately they believe that free will allows one to overcome (if they care enough to do so). This places blame and praise right back onto the individual in question.

Society respects the rich and looks down on the poor because we believe, quite simply, that people have the option to go against the grain of whatever life they’ve been handed. Those born into highly prosperous and educated families could end up squandering their good fortune away, and those born in urban welfare homes to single a single mom could end up going to Harvard.

If they choose to.

This belief has subtle but violent repercussions. It means that when that boy from the ghetto doesn’t make it out, he didn’t want it enough. It was his choice, and he didn’t put the work in.

This knight’s move constitutes nothing less than justification for looking down on those that don’t succeed. If you don’t think that’s significant, expand the concept out to groups of people, parts of town, and to entire nations.

The Link to Compassion

Imagine the local homeless person asking for a dollar on the street corner. I know countless deeply religious people who make it a rule to never give these people money. It is my belief that this is because they hold in their minds the conviction that this person chose to fail, and that they are basically refuse that will benefit from their monthly tithing through the church.

They don’t see someone who needs help; they see someone who has failed to help himself.

I, on the other hand, see a person who did not have advantages. Now, who do you think is more likely to be compassionate: the person who believes that he could have willed himself out of his situation, or the person who believes he was unfortunate and unable to escape?

That’s the key: compassion goes down the more you believe the person in the position deserves what they are experiencing. As such, those who believe in free will are naturally prone to be less compassionate.

Politics

This concept permeates the various political platforms. If you permit me the simplification, the right believes strongly in free will and therefore has far less sympathy for those who don’t achieve. The left believes far more in circumstances and variables, and therefore is more sympathetic to those who don’t succeed.

This translates directly to taxation as well. If you “deserve” your money, you shouldn’t have it taken from you. If you were lucky to get it then it should be spread to those who need it. Again, the sides on this debate fall right down the line of left and right.

Summary

No single question matters more in terms of human morality than that of whether not we have free will. To dodge this debate in the name of practicality is intellectual cowardice at this point in our civilization.

Put thought into and determine your position on this topic, and make the effort to ensure that your political views are consistent with it. ::

I have, over the last few years, put out a number of arguments against the possibility of free will. My most popular so far has been that of my Two-Lever Argument, which can be found here. I now wish to make a separate, distinct argument argument against free will called the Zero-Control argument.

The Zero-Control argument asks one to imagine a world before he was born. Imagine looking down at an earth without you in it. Now ask yourself how much control you have over that world. How much do you consciously affect what goes on in it? I think we can all agree the answer is zero.

Next, consider what happens after your parents have brought about the preconditions for your life. As you sit in the womb, sloshing to and fro as a collection of molecules and cells that you had no input into the organization of, what degree of control or choice do you have regarding your actions? What choices are you able to make that are not fully dependent on inputs from your genetic makeup and your environment? I think most will agree that the answer is still “none”.

The task now is to look at the next milestones of development–say, being a “willful” toddler who terrorizes households and disobeys the commands of parents. If one is to offer that such displays of “will” are now “free”, this raises the obvious question of, “When did that happen?” To be more pointed, at what point did the transition occur between being a simple collection of inputs processed by biological hardware, to being some sort of free being capable of making choices independent of inputs?

The same scenario can be extended to adolescence, or even full adulthood. The burden is on the believer in free will to describe, after admitting that a non-existent human has zero control, and a baby in the womb has pretty much the same amount, how exactly it is that someone switches from being purely deterministic to having free will. ¹ Let’s go from step one to adulthood:

1. You don’t exist. // control 0
2. You are a spermatozoon. // control 0
3. You are a fertilized egg. // control 0
   Up to this point it’s probably pretty clear that we, at this stage, are simply atoms bouncing off of each other. The key is to ask what changes as we progress.
4. You are an embryo in the womb. // control 0
5. You are a newborn. // what are you doing other than responding to your environment given your genetic makeup?
6. You are a toddler. // you now appear to be willful, but what has actually changed?
7. You are an adolescent. // now you have your own opinions, can be creative, etc. But again…same problem.
8. You are an adult. // see above

It seems clear that no transition ever takes place from zero control to more than zero control. We continue to be a collection of atoms bumping into each other, just as we were when we were spermatozoons clearly without free will. The perception of free will that comes as we mature is no different than the perception of intent in complex things like weather. As a primitive species, when we don’t understand something due to it’s complexity and hidden cause, we ascribe a sentient, mystical element to it.

We used to do this in how we described natural disasters and disease (it must be God!), and now we do the same with free will. The more we learn about the brain the more we’ll learn the actual, deterministic causes for the decisions we make.² The mystery will fall away from this just as it has for countless other natural phenomenon in the past. To assume otherwise is nothing less than foolish. ::

Notes

¹ Compatabilists, in my mind, are contorting free will to mean something other than making choices outside of natural inputs, therefore are excluded from the discussion. They’ve changed the definition as most think of it into “practical” free will, which I agree with by the way. See my essay on Absolute vs. Practical Free Will.
² This is already happening. We’re already able to observe “free choices” being made in very predictable fashion prior to the subject feeling they’ve made the choice, and we’re also able to directly influence people to make choices we want them to while the person feels they’re making the choice.

I write a lot about free will, and I am often asked the reason for this. My answer is invariably that, “it has moral implications”, but I’ve evidently failed to make a complete and/or successful argument on that vector. So here’s an attempt at one.

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My argument is that the belief in free will negatively affects societies that embrace such a belief. This is because beliefs affect behavior. If you believe it’s going to rain today, you bring an umbrella when you leave the house. And if you believe people have the option to do the right thing even when they’re overwhelmingly disadvantaged, this will be reflected clearly in your approach to criminal justice and social programs.

The horrific result of this is that societies which base their criminal justice systems on the belief in free will are less likely to engage in the types of activities that will help reduce the number of people who commit crimes, e.g. building better public schools, and offering health care for its citizens.

Imagine a rich, secluded city somewhere that has very little crime. Everyone in the town is highly educated and nobody lives below the poverty line. But they also believe strongly in free will–as given by God–as the primary factor making someone do a good thing or a bad thing. Consequently, they believe that the reason their city has so little crime is because they’re all so religious.

Now, when someone comes in from out of town and attacks one of them for money (he’s hungry and uneducated, etc, etc.), the reaction from that town’s population and court system will be wrong. Not different. Wrong.

The town’s reaction will be that this person had equal opportunity, given by God, to commit or not commit said crime. As a result, he then DESERVES punishment. It’s not that punishing him would be good for society as a deterrent, but rather that he deserves it for making the wrong choice. The importance of this distinction cannot be overstated.

Most importantly, and to return to my primary point, when it comes time to spend tax dollars, this town will spend its money on building new churches–not on going into poor neighborhoods and improving schools. And again, this will be a failure caused directly by the belief that a human’s choice is more important than his inputs in determining outcomes.

This is a battle-armored example of the belief in free will being morally harmful. It yields an inaccurate understanding of the nature of crime, and, necessarily, an equally flawed understanding of how to reduce it.

To summarize, the embrace of free will leads to the creation of societies that blame the individual for crime, while the the rejection of free will leads to the creation of society in which people understand that poor outcomes are due to poor inputs, and that the only purpose of punishment comes from a consequentialist perspective, and not a retributivist one.

This approach will lead to the adoption of social programs that aim to reduce the variables that cause negative outcomes, which is precisely what we see in secular societies such as Sweden and Denmark. There the penal systems are nearly 100% consequentialist, and it is my contention that this is due to a rejection of choice as a primary factor in negative outcomes.

And what’s the result? The lowest crime rates and the highest education rates in the entire world.

So, no–the discussion of free will is not merely academic or philosophical–it is crucial to the understanding of what causes negative outcomes in our society, and therefore what can be done to reduce those negative outcomes.

That’s why it matters whether or not we have free will. ::

http://danielmiessler.com/arguments/free_will/two_lever_argument/

Please follow it there and make a note of the location.

Thank you.

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