There are two levers for controlling outcomes in the universe, and you must be able to consciously change at least one of these in order to have any active influence on the world:

1. The previous state of the universe
   i.e. how the universe was configured at the moment prior to you making a decision.
2. The laws that govern the universe
   The physical rules that will determine how the universe transitions from one state to another, namely from that previous-state to the next-state.

Quite simply, if you do not have any control over at least one of these you cannot be in control of any future state of the universe. This includes any outcomes related to yourself, i.e. your own decisions and actions.

Neither quantum randomness nor consciousness provide an escape from this reality. The reason for this is simple: in order to provide an escape, an actor must, necessarily, provide a means to pull one of the levers described above.

There is a counter to this argument that’s likely to surface, which states that as soon as a human arrives on the scene and starts observing the world and making “decisions”, the results of his actions will then propagate forward into the inputs of other humans, thus rippling free will permanently into all future decisions for everyone else.

There are two problems with this line:

1. Humans did not always exist. When they did not, they had zero control over the previous state of the universe. A rigorous explanation is therefore required for how the first human gained control over the previous state of the universe, as this is a prerequisite for affecting any outcome.

2. Furthermore, even if a previous human (say, in the very beginning of humans) did somehow gain control over the universe for a moment in order to have a genuine effect, this action would not propagate as free will to future human actors, but rather as a standard physical input. In other words, each person hoping to exercise free will requires access to the past-state lever, not just a single previous person.

Again, regardless of what we experience as humans, if we cannot affect either the universe’s previous state or the laws that govern the transition to subsequent states, we are no more than an observer of events–regardless of any feelings to the contrary. ::

Image from skeptically.org

As even casual enthusiasts of philosophy will know, the debate about free will has been ongoing for hundreds of years. I’ll not go describe in any detail the various arguments here, however, as doing so will take considerable time.

Instead, I’ll assume the reader is to some degree familiar with the arguments of determinism vs. indeterminism, compatibilism vs. incompatibilism, and other fundamentals of the subject.

Here I will lay out two ways of looking at free will, which I call the absolute and the practical perspectives. I believe these two classifications take into account both the existing, well-traveled arguments as well as the treacherous semantic issues that frequently obscure free will discussions.

Absolute Free Will

absolute free will

absolute free will is the ability for an individual to make a choice outside physical causality, i.e. one that results from something other than a combination of physical preconditions and physical laws.

So, while emergence may yield extreme complexity–allowing for phenomenon like consciousness–this is ultimately nothing more than a playing out of two things: existing state and a set of natural laws. Those laws may lack randomness, in which case we’d have a hard determinist’s world, or it may be completely random at the quantum level.

Either way, the person making choices–regardless of how they appear or feel–is merely having these choices move through him (with consciousness as a means of experiencing them), as he has no control of either the preconditions or the laws that ultimately determine outcomes. In other words, at the most basic (and real) level, he’s not making any of the decisions at all.

It’s important to realize that the argument here is not one of pre-determinism or fate. No–the key concept isn’t whether or not these actions can be predicted, it’s that we as humans aren’t in control of the outcomes.

Practical Free Will

practical free will

practical free will is the ability for an individual to exert effort to evaluate alternatives–often involving significant complexity–and then take action based on his/her value system, e.g. swerving to avoid a deer on the road, or going hungry to feed a child.

The key for this definition is that it is a practical one. It feels as if we’re making decisions, and outcomes are shaped by our deliberations, so any arguments about what is actually happening are largely academic. This is the view of free will that most have (excluding those who think free will comes directly from God).

As Daniel Dennett points out, we as humans have the ability to do things like decide to go to work to avoid being fired, or to influence climate for future generations, or to blow up distant astroids to keep them from crashing into Earth 5 years into the future. These things require complex analysis of variables for the purpose of promoting our own goals–which may even be altruistic if so inclined.

The argument for practical free will is actually stunningly simple:

Basically, if it feels like you make decisions, and the outcomes that result help you to achieve your goals due to the analysis you performed, and you can continue to do this repeatedly (learning more as you go in order to enhance the process) then what else is there?

In other words, what else can be gained by attaining absolute free will? Will it not feel identical anyway, and will it not result in essentially the same outcomes? In short, it very well may be true that we lack absolute free will, but who cares? Practical free will offers the same benefits, and we all agree that it’s a reality here and now.

Why the Distinction is Important

So, that being said, many ask why pointing out the distinction between absolute and practical free will is important at all. The answer is that the question of absolute free will is highly…practical when it comes to political philosophy–especially related to the treatment of the successful (taxation) and the poor (education and punishment).

Once a person accepts that absolute free will is false, it becomes considerably more difficult to say that someone “deserves” to suffer, or that someone “deserves” to be inordinately rich. In other words, accepting absolute free will means accepting that each persons’ position in life is ultimately a matter of chance.

This has direct and monumental implications on how society should be built. Subscribers to this world view would be more inclined to isolate and educate criminals rather than punish them and deride them. They would also be more naturally willing to support the use of extreme wealth to lift those that need help.

A belief that absolute free will does not exist promotes a world view in which compassion, rather than selfishness, is backed by science. If you believe that everyone has the ability to make choices–to whatever degree–apart from their circumstances then this belief instantly justifies the chasm between those who have and those who do not.

Any time you find intelligent rich people surrounded by, but insulated from, ignorance and suffering–where they either feel apathetic toward their plight and/or feel as if they deserve their lesser position in life–you can draw a straight line from those beliefs to their belief in absolute free will (which is usually rooted in religion).

Rejecting absolute free will prevents this connection, and forces any affluent thinking person to realize that their position of strength is not an earned possession, but rather a responsibility to be wielded.

Conclusion

While all of the variations of free will belief are no-doubt valid within a philosophical context I believe the most tangible and meaningful distinctions are defined by a practical vs. absolute belief.

The argument for practical free will reduces to effective free will, meaning we get all the benefits of choice, as if we truly had it, so it matters not if we don’t. We are still able, as humans, to experience making choices, avoid harm by evaluating complex sets of variables while contemplating the future, and improve our own thinking processes through science that we developed.

This highlights the semantic nature of the free will debate. If practical free will, as described above, is what most people consider to be free will, and the reality of the absolute version (breaking causality) would not change the experience humans have when compared to practical free will, then it is easy to see how one person could be arguing that free will exists while thinking of practical free will while the other can argue that it doesn’t while thinking of the absolute version. I believe this to be the semantic foundation of conflict between the two camps.

In any case, the ability to function in our world is made possible by a belief in practical free will, and this should never be disrespected given the stability it brings. However, a acceptance that absolute free will is false is still crucial for any advanced individual or society, as it allows one to free himself of perhaps the most dangerous moral idea of all: the idea that someone can deserve to suffer or prosper. ::

To those who believe in free will the mission is clear: show me where the laws of physics stop and where free will begins.

First off, we need to agree on the meaning of free will before we proceed. Too many arguments (most?) are enormous time drains resulting in no progress simply because people had different ideas about the nature of the argument. Here are a couple of definitions:

Stanford

A philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives.

Wikipedia

[snip] Addressing this question requires understanding the relationship between freedom and cause, and determining whether the laws of nature are causally deterministic. The various philosophical positions taken differ on whether all events are determined or not — determinism versus indeterminism — and also on whether freedom can coexist with determinism or not — compatibilism versus incompatibilism. So, for instance, ‘hard determinists’ argue that the universe is deterministic, and that this makes free will impossible.

I prefer Wikipedia’s definition, as it offers more detail regarding the crucial point of determinism. That is, if the universe is bound by physics–even if there is true randomness at the quantum level–then every physical and chemical interaction that takes place in your body will take place according to the laws of physics.

The mission of the free will proponent is to explain to us how exactly this is not the case. In other words, if the physical world’s numerous interactions take place according to the laws of physics–and our bodies are bound by those same laws–then at what point does a human decision become an input type that exists outside those laws? And would that not necessarily have to be super-natural?

The free will argument usually takes the shape of:

We can’t possibly know or understand all the physical interactions taking place. They’re opaque to us. The brain’s decision center is a black box. Therefore we have free will.

This is a strikingly insufficient argument. It’s like building a transparent machine with a billion moving parts that’s spread out over the size of a football field, and then covering various portions of the machine with giant tarps. Then, because someone can’t see exactly what’s happening under those covered areas, they claim, “That’s where the free will lives”.

Laid out like that you can see the problem, but now realize that that the human body is one such machine. It’s vast, it’s complex, and much of it is still covered with tarps. But why are we so quick to abandon science when faced with a lack of specific knowledge? Isn’t this like inventing God to explain weather patterns?

Do we not know how countless functions work within the human body? Do we not understand these interactions to be completely physical in nature? At what point are we to believe this system breaks down and yields to something other than physics and chemistry? Nowhere, and that’s the problem. Free will requires an input that exists outside of the system.

In order to believe in true free will, you must believe that your personal decision-making-ability exists outside of all other physical variables. It’s a remarkable proposition if you think about it. You have to believe that the physical world combines all its variables, i.e. your genetics, your upbringing, your mood, whether you’re hungry, tired, drunk, etc.–all according to the laws of physics that you accept–and then you somehow bestow upon this focal point a completely separate type of input in order to make the decision.

I ask anyone who believes this a simple question: where exactly do you think that separate input is coming from? Your options are limited. In fact, I think you have only one–the supernatural.

Practical vs. True Free Will

There’s another argument that I want to address. Many take the line that we “practically” have free will since we can’t possibly see the variables involved, or because we as a civilization need the concept of free will in order to hold people responsible for their actions. I fully agree with this position, and if that’s your definition of free will then you’ll get no argument from me.

But that’s not what religion means by free will, and it’s not what most seem to mean when they talk about it. Most truly think they are making decisions separately from physics. In other words, if I were to say that they did x because of all the variables that led up to the decision, they would say no. They would say the variables all played a part, but at the end they had a choice. This is the part that requires the supernatural, and that’s the part I reject outright.

What About Randomness?

One concept free will supporters almost invariably lean upon is the possibility of quantum randomness. So, as the argument goes, if true randomness exists at the molecular level then there is no such thing as determinism.

Fair enough–no argument there. Unfortunately, this lends no support to the free will argument. Why would it? Even if the universe were to be truly random, it would say absolutely nothing about your individual ability to effect its outcome. Again, that would require that your decision-making ability exist outside the system. So, fine, keep your subatomic randomness; keep your non-deterministic reality–it doesn’t mean we have any individual input into the outcome.

The Behavior Modification Argument

Another line that many take for support of free will is that of being able to change habits and other types of behavior based on analysis. The argument goes:

I used to drink regular, sugar soda, but then I found out how bad it was for my arterial health. So, even though I loved it, and I craved it, I made the conscious choice to stop drinking it and switch to diet soda.

This is attractive at first glance but ultimately fails the same test as any other “I felt myself make the decision” scenario. It implies that the analysis of previous, undesired situations–and then the ability to navigate around those situations to change outcomes–somehow avoids the world of cause and effect.

But no part of your analysis of the preconditions, nor the conditions themselves, fall outside of the physical realm. As a result, nothing about your decision itself can fall outside of that realm either. Hence, the outcome that results comes from the preconditions, regardless of what you “feel” took place.

In other words, we haven’t avoided the primary question: which part of that process existed outside of physics and chemistry? I have a few variables to consider that exist in the realm of physics, so let’s evaluate them:

1. Intelligence: you have a good IQ due to genetics, being raised well, and having good nutrition as a child.
2. Education: you learned about how the body works in school.
3. Experience: you saw people get very sick from consuming too much sugar, so you wanted to avoid the same fate.

It seems magical, but it’s rather easy to see where the inputs came from once you decide to look. It’s a pleasant illusion of self-control that no-doubt has roots in evolutionary biology. It wants you to believe that the physical variables existed and put pressure on your decisions, but then you leveraged your deep insight and sage-like experience to temper and enhance the outcome. But in reality, all that happened was your genetics, education, and experience became part of the variables.

And this is constantly happening. It’s the Butterfly Effect. You missed the train in London because you stopped to give money to a homeless person. Because you missed the train you had to wait for a taxi, and the taxi driver who picked you up had a heart attack while driving, which led to an accident where you broke your wrist. And because you broke your wrist you couldn’t play hockey for a month. And because of that you didn’t get on the team plane to fly to Hawaii–a plane that crashed and killed everyone on board.

So, because a homeless person got moved into your path randomly (he was just told to move from his regular spot that morning) you didn’t die in a plane crash along with five of your close friends.

What does this have to do with free will? Well, when you go to get on a plane next time, or you go to give money to a homeless person, all this information will be processed by your brain–both subconsciously and consciously–and an outcome will result. That outcome will seem purely self-made, but in fact it will have been a product of how much you know about statistics, whether you’ve read this post or not, whether you know what the Butterfly Effect is, how hungry you are, how tired you are, AND the fact that you know all these things are variables.

But whether you have this knowledge or not doesn’t change the physical reality that all of this information is simply processed as variables–all within the realm of the natural world. An outcome will result, and you won’t know exactly what variables led to that outcome, but you will no-doubt feel as if you were the one making the choice. It’s an illusion–just as with simpler examples that don’t involve conscious analysis.

The Influence Element

One thing I find peculiar about the free will argument, when coming from educated and intelligent people, is that they accept that food and drugs and all sorts of chemical and hormonal levels affect the ability to make decisions, yet they fail to see how free will is being infringed upon by these influences.

Here are a few of my favorite examples:

1. being attracted to beautiful women
2. wanting water when you get rescued out of a desert after a day without
3. being unable to think about Calculus or Chess if you’re in extreme pain
4. exposure to narcotics
5. being knocked unconscious

So, what part of an autonomous you compels you to look at a highly attractive woman when she walks by? Where was your decision to do that? When you are dying of thirst, and your thoughts are consumed with the idea of drinking water, why don’t you simply decide to not want to drink water? If you’ve severely burned yourself on a hot stove, and are in route to the hospital, how come you can’t elect to consider chess moves instead of the pain?

How can a drug like crack cause someone to stop loving their husband, wife, or child? Why doesn’t an addict simply choose not to be affected by the drug? Or, what choice do you have to pass out or not if your air supply is cut off to your brain? You are you, right? Who’s going to tell you to go unconscious if you don’t want to?

The answer is that, to varying degrees, we lose control over ourselves when exposed to variables in the environment. This can be anything from being unable to stop stealing glances at attractive breasts, to feeling euphoria from an opiate, to being unable to avoid passing out while in a choke hold. And most intelligent free-willers accept this. The key is realizing that passing out from the choke is very much the same as wanting to look at a pretty girl.

This exact same phenomenon is going on at all times–every moment of every day–within our own bodies and minds. Every single decision we make is being guided in precisely the same way as passing out from lack of oxygen to the brain, or by consumed by thirst, or dizzy with alcohol poisoning. So the question becomes: if we know we’re losing some degree of free will by being under these influences, and you know that every metric in your body affects those same decisions, why would you assume that when the extreme and obvious variables go away you somehow regain free will?

Conclusion

Just because you feel it, doesn’t mean it’s there.

I do not see any way in which true free will is compatible with a physical, non-supernatural reality. Atoms crash into each other according to laws (add randomness, if you so desire), and at the end of any particular human decision point (an arbitrary point from the perspective of physics) you arrive at an outcome.

These events move through us. The illusion of free will can perhaps be described as a function of consciousness whereby we are able to vaguely glimpse some portion of the variable combination process, and, through some feat of evolutionary trickery, become convinced that we had a part in it. The fact that our bodies have been programmed to irrationally attribute some of these outcomes to our own decision-making powers (outside the world of physics) is no-doubt a scientific phenomenon that’s much easier to explain than any would-be magical decision source.

Free will, like the empirical truth of popular religions, will soon be seen for what it is–an illusion. Whether those constructs are useful is another matter altogether, but their basis in reality will not be debated by the intellectual elite for much longer. That time will soon pass, and I for one will be glad when it happens.

But for those who still cling to it, the challenge is clear. Show us the source of human decision-making that exists outside of the physical world. Only then will you have any basis for true (as opposed to practical) free will. ::

[ 2009-07-07 : EDIT | Argument clean-up. ]