Comments on: The Prisoner’s Dilemma: The Key To Successful Civilization http://danielmiessler.com/blog/the-prisoners-dilemma-the-key-to-successful-civilization grep understanding Fri, 19 Mar 2010 22:30:03 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: Craig S Wright http://danielmiessler.com/blog/the-prisoners-dilemma-the-key-to-successful-civilization/comment-page-1#comment-51054 Craig S Wright Fri, 27 Apr 2007 06:27:29 +0000 http://dmiessler.com/archives/1219#comment-51054 <p>I would suggest that you read: Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction Peter C. Ordeshook Published 1986, Cambridge University Press</p> <p>End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach Reinhard Selten and Rolf Stoecker University of Bonn, D-5300, Bonn 1, FRG</p> <p>Prisoner's Dilemma Anatol ( Rapoport Contributor Albert M. Chammah Published 1965 University of Michigan Press</p> <p>And if you get time the last one: Kreps and Wilson, 1982. D. Kreps and R. Wilson , Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982), pp. 253–279. Abstract | Full Text Links | PDF (1664 K) | MathSciNet</p> <p>Is most critical. The issue is that you require a system of determining reputation. In general society, many events are not reported.</p> <p>This also demonstrates a pattern where "players" will cooperate until shortly before the end of the "game". At this point, a deviation towards non-cooperative behaviour has been demonstrated as the most effective strategy.</p> <p>Regards, Craig</p> I would suggest that you read: Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction Peter C. Ordeshook Published 1986, Cambridge University Press

End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner’s Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach Reinhard Selten and Rolf Stoecker University of Bonn, D-5300, Bonn 1, FRG

Prisoner’s Dilemma Anatol ( Rapoport Contributor Albert M. Chammah Published 1965 University of Michigan Press

And if you get time the last one: Kreps and Wilson, 1982. D. Kreps and R. Wilson , Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982), pp. 253–279. Abstract | Full Text Links | PDF (1664 K) | MathSciNet

Is most critical. The issue is that you require a system of determining reputation. In general society, many events are not reported.

This also demonstrates a pattern where “players” will cooperate until shortly before the end of the “game”. At this point, a deviation towards non-cooperative behaviour has been demonstrated as the most effective strategy.

Regards, Craig

]]> By: τεχνοσοφια » Blog Archive » Five extrabiblioblogospheric blogs http://danielmiessler.com/blog/the-prisoners-dilemma-the-key-to-successful-civilization/comment-page-1#comment-40338 τεχνοσοφια » Blog Archive » Five extrabiblioblogospheric blogs Tue, 20 Mar 2007 23:56:15 +0000 http://dmiessler.com/archives/1219#comment-40338 <p>[...] “grep understanding knowledge” - He writes about society, programming, UNIX administration, and his personal life. I enjoy both his writing style and the [...]</p> [...] “grep understanding knowledge” – He writes about society, programming, UNIX administration, and his personal life. I enjoy both his writing style and the [...]

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