The Prisoner’s Dilemma: The Key To Successful Civilization

By Daniel Miessler on March 19th, 2007: Tagged as Evolution | Philosophy | Politics
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  • Craig S Wright

    I would suggest that you read: Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction Peter C. Ordeshook Published 1986, Cambridge University Press

    End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner’s Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach Reinhard Selten and Rolf Stoecker University of Bonn, D-5300, Bonn 1, FRG

    Prisoner’s Dilemma Anatol ( Rapoport Contributor Albert M. Chammah Published 1965 University of Michigan Press

    And if you get time the last one: Kreps and Wilson, 1982. D. Kreps and R. Wilson , Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982), pp. 253–279. Abstract | Full Text Links | PDF (1664 K) | MathSciNet

    Is most critical. The issue is that you require a system of determining reputation. In general society, many events are not reported.

    This also demonstrates a pattern where “players” will cooperate until shortly before the end of the “game”. At this point, a deviation towards non-cooperative behaviour has been demonstrated as the most effective strategy.

    Regards, Craig

  • Craig S Wright

    I would suggest that you read: Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction Peter C. Ordeshook Published 1986, Cambridge University Press

    End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner’s Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach Reinhard Selten and Rolf Stoecker University of Bonn, D-5300, Bonn 1, FRG

    Prisoner’s Dilemma Anatol ( Rapoport Contributor Albert M. Chammah Published 1965 University of Michigan Press

    And if you get time the last one: Kreps and Wilson, 1982. D. Kreps and R. Wilson , Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982), pp. 253–279. Abstract | Full Text Links | PDF (1664 K) | MathSciNet

    Is most critical. The issue is that you require a system of determining reputation. In general society, many events are not reported.

    This also demonstrates a pattern where “players” will cooperate until shortly before the end of the “game”. At this point, a deviation towards non-cooperative behaviour has been demonstrated as the most effective strategy.

    Regards, Craig


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