Galen Strawson – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Actually, mine is slightly different–now that I re-read it–but the idea is the same. You must control the previous state before you can be responsible for future states.

I would suggest that regardless of how much or how little power we have to freely make choices, it is to the greatest benefit of society to have a legal system in place that holds individuals responsible for their actions. This system serves to lessen “bad” behavior (behavior that negatively impacts others). Even those who don't believe in free will believe that individuals are motivated by such a system and have their behavior modified by such a system – that is, the exhibited behavior is different than what we would see in the absence of such a system. I can see no way in which our actions as individuals or as a society should be any different if there is no free will than if there is. Thus, it seems to me that the “truth” in this case (if it is knowable at all) is irrelevant to how we lead our lives. It seems of no more importance than a semantic argument (though I'm not suggesting that it IS a semantic argument).

I disagree; I think there is, and always should be, a distinction between what IS true, and what is practically true. Right now we can't do anything with that distinction, but I do think it's valuable to map it out for when there is something we can do.

You're basically arguing for a deterrent model, where people should be held responsible for their actions so that they know they will be, and hence will offend less. But I think that's rather coarse compared to our potential.

It requires energy to exert will for the same reason that it requires energy to hold ones hands over their head: There is a force in the opposite direction that must be overcome.

If no such force existed, then it would not require energy.

It requires energy to force oneself to get up in the morning because the default is to sleep later (for someone who's still sleepy, of course). And it requires force to abstain from food when one is hungry because the body is telling them to eat.

In other words, physical realities exist in the body that act as forces in a given direction, and going against those forces is something that is significant–even if minor in most cases.

To say that the fact that using this willpower to counter an urge is proof of free will is highly suspect. I am quite sure you can find examples in the animal kingdom of a monkey, or a gorilla, or even a dog or a cougar, overcoming their desire to eat with a desire to feed a friend or one of their young.

You could argue that this would simply be one innate tendency fighting another, but I would argue that our decisions are simply more advanced versions of that same thing.

Also, I'm not arguing that there's DEFINITELY no free will. What I'm arguing is that the correct default position on the matter is that of non-belief in it, and I submit as evidence my Two Variable argument, and Strawson's Basic Argument.

In fact, after a bit of reflection, that IS how I define free will. Indeed, I see no other good way to define it. This is why I find that experiment so compelling. It is evidence that we -are- exerting ourselves to make certain choices (which says, in part, that we are making choices!!!). In any case, if you have a different definition, then this really is a semantic argument.