• Shenpen

    I think the problem is that you are trying to turn a philosophical problem into a problem of natural science, which is in itself not a wrong idea, but then trying to import the result back into philosophy and this is what wrong is.

    It's OK to say that withing the realm, within the point of view of natural sciences, everything we are is a material process, because these are the processes natural science is able to investigate. Thus, indeed, natural science must indeed delegate the problem back to philosophy, from the natural science point of view, it's super-natural i.e. outside the scope of natural sciences. Thus, the natural scientist must not assume it exists, neither that it doesn't exist, but must simply say it's not in his field of study, he will assume neither but simply go on studying all those 100000000000 interesting things he is well equipped to study. There is no such thing as a burden of proof within the scope of natural sciences in the question of free will once we agree that it's something that's by DEFINITION outside the material realms and therefore natural science shouldn't even bother about it. It's exactly the same problem as the existence of a god or reincarnation or afterlife or anything: plain simply not in the field of natural sciences, neither a positive, nor a negative assumption, nor any kind of burden of proof exists, rather it's simply off the table. It's like when the physicist is asked to translate Shakespeare to Chinese: he would say it's not his job, leave him alone with it. This is the correct approach.

    Thus, the natural science must delegate the problem back to philosophy. But in philosophy why on Earth would anything “super-natural” i.e. anything outside the scope of natural sciences automatically require a direct proof or be considered bullshit? From the viewpoint of philosophy the whole field of natural sciences is one of applied philosophy, largely the philosophy of empiricism. If empiricism is not suitable for investigating a problem, the philosopher shouldn't worry much, there are thousand and one other philosophical ways to approach such problems, from Platonic realism through Cartesian principles to social constructionism etc. etc. etc.

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    Very interesting point–this discussion of what realm this belongs in. I'll
    have to think about this more and address it later, as I'm at work now.

  • Shenpen

    I think the problem is that you are trying to turn a philosophical problem into a problem of natural science, which is in itself not a wrong idea, but then trying to import the result back into philosophy and this is what wrong is.

    It's OK to say that withing the realm, within the point of view of natural sciences, everything we are is a material process, because these are the processes natural science is able to investigate. Thus, indeed, natural science must indeed delegate the problem back to philosophy, from the natural science point of view, it's super-natural i.e. outside the scope of natural sciences. Thus, the natural scientist must not assume it exists, neither that it doesn't exist, but must simply say it's not in his field of study, he will assume neither but simply go on studying all those 100000000000 interesting things he is well equipped to study. There is no such thing as a burden of proof within the scope of natural sciences in the question of free will once we agree that it's something that's by DEFINITION outside the material realms and therefore natural science shouldn't even bother about it. It's exactly the same problem as the existence of a god or reincarnation or afterlife or anything: plain simply not in the field of natural sciences, neither a positive, nor a negative assumption, nor any kind of burden of proof exists, rather it's simply off the table. It's like when the physicist is asked to translate Shakespeare to Chinese: he would say it's not his job, leave him alone with it. This is the correct approach.

    Thus, the natural science must delegate the problem back to philosophy. But in philosophy why on Earth would anything “super-natural” i.e. anything outside the scope of natural sciences automatically require a direct proof or be considered bullshit? From the viewpoint of philosophy the whole field of natural sciences is one of applied philosophy, largely the philosophy of empiricism. If empiricism is not suitable for investigating a problem, the philosopher shouldn't worry much, there are thousand and one other philosophical ways to approach such problems, from Platonic realism through Cartesian principles to social constructionism etc. etc. etc.

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    Very interesting point–this discussion of what realm this belongs in. I'll
    have to think about this more and address it later, as I'm at work now.

  • CuriousGeorge

    Although I am not very educated in physics…i ran into this thready today and it caught my interest. It also appears that I am a year late. However, because I find it interesting and in the off chance that somebody will receive notification of my post and actually care, I will state my thoughts anyways.

    I too seem to be confused as to how non-deterministic processes would somehow allow for free will to exist. Just because this scenario would prove determinism false, it does not follow that it introduces the possibility of free will being true. This is because the claims of libertarian free will are stronger than non-determinism.

    The problem with libertarian free will is not its claim of the ability to do otherwise, but more with its claim of the control to do otherwise. We might say that matter involved in non-determined events has the ability to behave differently, yet we would not say that this matter has the control to behave differently. But the very essence of libertarian free will includes that the agent has the ability to control. That one can control the outcome. That one can control certain (albeit not all) thoughts. That one can control the brain and can control the body.

    In both a deterministic and a non-deterministic materialist framework, it seems to be impossible to describe free will as “An individual’s ability to control an outcome”. Consider the statement “I control my body”. This sentence is understandable if I think of “I” (the self) as a non-material agent. But what does “I control my body” mean when the self equates to the physical matter constituting the body.

    I do agree that the existence of non-deterministic events will allow us to say phrases like “I could have done otherwise” or “I had the ability to do otherwise” but these statements should be read more like “This action was the result of non-determined neurophysical events in my brain and those events could have had different outcomes resulting in a different action being performed”. But this statement seems pretty far away from a libertarian free will statement that would try to assert that “It was in my control to do otherwise.”

    In summary, it seems to make sense to say that matter has the ability to produce a non-deterministic outcome, but it doesn’t seem to make sense to say that matter can control the outcome.

    Do the minds trained in physics have some ideas about the plausibility of matter being able to control an outcome? Could it make sense to talk like this?


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