Absolute vs. Practical Free Will

By Daniel Miessler on October 15th, 2009: Tagged as Free Will | Philosophy

freewill
Image from skeptically.org

As even casual enthusiasts of philosophy will know, the debate about free will has been ongoing for hundreds of years. I’ll not go describe in any detail the various arguments here, however, as doing so will take considerable time.

Instead, I’ll assume the reader is to some degree familiar with the arguments of determinism vs. indeterminism, compatibilism vs. incompatibilism, and other fundamentals of the subject.

Here I will lay out two ways of looking at free will, which I call the absolute and the practical perspectives. I believe these two classifications take into account both the existing, well-traveled arguments as well as the treacherous semantic issues that frequently obscure free will discussions.

Absolute Free Will

absolute free will
absolute free will is the ability for an individual to make a choice outside physical causality, i.e. one that results from something other than a combination of physical preconditions and physical laws.

So, while emergence may yield extreme complexity–allowing for phenomenon like consciousness–this is ultimately nothing more than a playing out of two things: existing state and a set of natural laws. Those laws may lack randomness, in which case we’d have a hard determinist’s world, or it may be completely random at the quantum level.

Either way, the person making choices–regardless of how they appear or feel–is merely having these choices move through him (with consciousness as a means of experiencing them), as he has no control of either the preconditions or the laws that ultimately determine outcomes. In other words, at the most basic (and real) level, he’s not making any of the decisions at all.

It’s important to realize that the argument here is not one of pre-determinism or fate. No–the key concept isn’t whether or not these actions can be predicted, it’s that we as humans aren’t in control of the outcomes.

Practical Free Will

practical free will
practical free will is the ability for an individual to exert effort to evaluate alternatives–often involving significant complexity–and then take action based on his/her value system, e.g. swerving to avoid a deer on the road, or going hungry to feed a child.

The key for this definition is that it is a practical one. It feels as if we’re making decisions, and outcomes are shaped by our deliberations, so any arguments about what is actually happening are largely academic. This is the view of free will that most have (excluding those who think free will comes directly from God).

As Daniel Dennett points out, we as humans have the ability to do things like decide to go to work to avoid being fired, or to influence climate for future generations, or to blow up distant astroids to keep them from crashing into Earth 5 years into the future. These things require complex analysis of variables for the purpose of promoting our own goals–which may even be altruistic if so inclined.

The argument for practical free will is actually stunningly simple:

Basically, if it feels like you make decisions, and the outcomes that result help you to achieve your goals due to the analysis you performed, and you can continue to do this repeatedly (learning more as you go in order to enhance the process) then what else is there?

In other words, what else can be gained by attaining absolute free will? Will it not feel identical anyway, and will it not result in essentially the same outcomes? In short, it very well may be true that we lack absolute free will, but who cares? Practical free will offers the same benefits, and we all agree that it’s a reality here and now.

choices

Why the Distinction is Important

So, that being said, many ask why pointing out the distinction between absolute and practical free will is important at all. The answer is that the question of absolute free will is highly…practical when it comes to political philosophy–especially related to the treatment of the successful (taxation) and the poor (education and punishment).

Once a person accepts that absolute free will is false, it becomes considerably more difficult to say that someone “deserves” to suffer, or that someone “deserves” to be inordinately rich. In other words, accepting absolute free will means accepting that each persons’ position in life is ultimately a matter of chance.

This has direct and monumental implications on how society should be built. Subscribers to this world view would be more inclined to isolate and educate criminals rather than punish them and deride them. They would also be more naturally willing to support the use of extreme wealth to lift those that need help.

A belief that absolute free will does not exist promotes a world view in which compassion, rather than selfishness, is backed by science. If you believe that everyone has the ability to make choices–to whatever degree–apart from their circumstances then this belief instantly justifies the chasm between those who have and those who do not.

Any time you find intelligent rich people surrounded by, but insulated from, ignorance and suffering–where they either feel apathetic toward their plight and/or feel as if they deserve their lesser position in life–you can draw a straight line from those beliefs to their belief in absolute free will (which is usually rooted in religion).

Rejecting absolute free will prevents this connection, and forces any affluent thinking person to realize that their position of strength is not an earned possession, but rather a responsibility to be wielded.

Conclusion

While all of the variations of free will belief are no-doubt valid within a philosophical context I believe the most tangible and meaningful distinctions are defined by a practical vs. absolute belief.

The argument for practical free will reduces to effective free will, meaning we get all the benefits of choice, as if we truly had it, so it matters not if we don’t. We are still able, as humans, to experience making choices, avoid harm by evaluating complex sets of variables while contemplating the future, and improve our own thinking processes through science that we developed.

This highlights the semantic nature of the free will debate. If practical free will, as described above, is what most people consider to be free will, and the reality of the absolute version (breaking causality) would not change the experience humans have when compared to practical free will, then it is easy to see how one person could be arguing that free will exists while thinking of practical free will while the other can argue that it doesn’t while thinking of the absolute version. I believe this to be the semantic foundation of conflict between the two camps.

In any case, the ability to function in our world is made possible by a belief in practical free will, and this should never be disrespected given the stability it brings. However, a acceptance that absolute free will is false is still crucial for any advanced individual or society, as it allows one to free himself of perhaps the most dangerous moral idea of all: the idea that someone can deserve to suffer or prosper. ::

  • CarlM

    Um …

    You say this about “absolute free will”: “… In other words, at the most basic (and real) level, he’s not making any of the decisions at all.”

    You say THIS about “practical free will”: “practical free will is the ability for an individual to exert effort to evaluate situations–often involving significant complexity–and make decisions based on his value system.”

    Do you see the problem here?

    Your argument against “absolute free will” is that we can't make decisions. IF that is true, then the same argument implies that we don't have “practical free will either” .. at least not as you've defined it.

    This will be my only reply to this post. I understand that you've put a lot of thought into these definitions and that you believe that your argument is tied somehow to these definitions. It's just a semantic argument.

    As long as we're making definitions .. here's mine:

    Free will is the ability to make a decision that could not (even in principle) be predicted by someone else EVEN if they had as complete a knowledge of the state of the universe and the laws that govern it as is theoretically possible.

    (Please note that my definition does NOT assert that anything is happening outside of the laws of physics.)

  • cooperati

    If one accepts the maintainance or progress of the human race as an underlying goal, then the tenets implied in darwinistic social repercussions are looked on favorably. Hence, when a criminal is caught, and suffers punishment, it is towards either the maintainance or progress of the rest of society that he is withdrawn from the pool of demographics on that social ladder. Alternately, when a genius produces a thing that the society benefits, he, or at least his genetics, are rewarded. His “blameless” soul isn't.

    Regardless of free will, under most circumstances, a mutually accepted social contract refuses failures to compete. Deservance establishes a fate, by the conditions of the contract, as it also establishes rewards.

    Lastly, it's important to note that there are different levels of control in our physical world. I can, as I've mentioned, choose my next word, but I cannot choose to live without eating. I can choose to go to China next year, but I cannot choose to hold my breath until I get there (and not hurt myself). It is in these differing levels of control that we understand how we can alter our world through our actions, our options as it were, and without the impetus of the abstract “free will”, we wouldn't do anything.

    We live in a world of abstracts, mental artifacts that we utilize to organize our perceptions of the world, or of our objectives. I bet you've never held a January in your hand, or stroked a Tuesday behind the ear. If they are as real as you accept God is, then skip them entirely, and withdraw from the realm of humanity that does not go without using them.

    If you give in to believing that free will can't exist, and that there is no such thing as deservance, then when confronted with a criminal who wants your money and your life, give it to him. Or don't. It won't matter.

    (But, really, don't.)

    -=T=-

    ps, if you really want to blow your mind, then realize we already live outside of a physical universe wherein “absolute” free will equally doesn't exist.

    And, finally, as I am fond of saying, “there are absolutely no absolutes.” In a finite universe, nothing can be infinite. Time and space are mutable. Why not the limits of an abstract that exists in the artifaces of literature and conversation, if not also in imperical truths divined by scientific observation?

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    I modified my definition for free will.

    I agree the argument is semantic, i.e. different people can think free will means different things. That's why I've put these definitions out–to show that free will DOES exist in a practical sense in the way that I describe above.

    In short, if absolute free will doesn't give us anything practical above what we already have, then we already have practical free will.

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    > Free will is the ability to make a decision that could not (even in principle) be predicted by someone else EVEN if they had as complete a knowledge of the state of the universe and the laws that govern it as is theoretically possible.

    Carl, you said you didn't agree with the argument for free will that hinged on breaking physical causality. And you again confirmed this by saying you don't believe this definition lies outside of physics.

    How do you see this?

    If you know the universe's previous state, and you know the laws that will govern its transition to its subsequent state, then you now know the paramaters for causality. So to say that you can invoke free will to avoid predictability DOES MEAN that you are breaking physical causality.

    Since I doubt you would take that line I think your point must rely on a yet unknown element of physical law that provides for the unpredictability of human choice.

    I will say again to you that this is an incredible leap of faith. To say that we could know virtually everything about how the universe works and be able to predict 99.9999% of all actions from the subatomic level to the collision of galaxies, and that we'd then discover some physical law that gives HUMANS the ability to make unpredictable choices screams of a wishful belief in magic.

    Here's the argument you seem to be making:

    1. you feel like you have free will, and others feel the same, so that's evidence we can't ignore
    2. since we have massive gaps in our knowledge of physics, one of those gaps might one day provide the free will you're experiencing

    This is a fine argument until you realize it applies to feeling the love of Jesus as well. Since we don't understand the universe in total we cannot say for sure that the feeling of being touched by god is not scientific and true, so it's therefore still on the table–just like free will.

    I actually don't disagree, I just think they're equally likely, which is to say–not very.

    If your position from there is to say that you don't deal with probabilities since you're an agnostic, and that you're just pointing out that we don't know for sure, then we have arrived at our same place again regarding agnosticism and atheism.

    In short, I'm willing to remove hair with Occam's razor in this case and say that because we can see evidence of physical causality for the illusion of free will, and because many things we feel are known to be illusions, then there's no reason to think free will is any different.

    This is a leap, to be sure, but it's not much more of a leap than saying Jesus is not the son of God. In both cases, we don't know for sure and our lack of understanding of the laws of physics leave room for both to be true.

  • CarlM

    Daniel,

    As some of the other comments and reactions have pointed out (both implicitly and explicitly), I think that you’re expecting too much from science. Science is about explaining and predicting empirical data. I would suggest that if a theory cannot be disproven with such data, it is not a scientific theory. It may (or may not) be that philosophical arguments have a different standard.

    Those who say that free will can’t exist often argue as you did: If we knew the complete state of the universe (including the current brain state of an individual) and the laws that govern the universe (and the laws that govern the workings of the brain of that individual), then we could in principle predict everything that the individual will do. The argument is that if we can predict with certainty what the person will do, then they are little more than an automaton and do not have free will. It seems to me that this argument relies quite heavily on the certainty of the prediction. After all, nobody argues that a close friend can’t predict reasonably well what someone will do. The bit that excludes free will is being able to predict with CERTAINTY what someone will do.

    As I will remind you in the scenario I lay out below, the problem with this argument is that the world doesn’t work like that, at least not according to our current understanding of physical law. In particular, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle says that it is impossible (even in principle) to know the precise current state of even ONE particle (let alone the current state of every particle in the universe).

    So, how does the uncertainty of the universe allow me to do something that is unpredictable to you even in principle? Consider the following scenario: I tell you that tomorrow at noon I will raise either my right or my left hand and ask you to predict (with certainty) which it will be. You may claim that the uncertainty of quantum mechanics does not apply in any meaningful way to the workings of my brain (whether this is so or not is not clear to me, but turns out to be irrelevant to my scenario), so you will conclude that a full knowledge of the state of my brain and the rest of the universe would allow you to predict which hand I will raise (even given the limitation on this knowledge implied by quantum theory). Tomorrow at 11:59 AM, I will start a Geiger counter (which has been placed in the vicinity of a weak radiation source – a source that will produce roughly 100 clicks per minute) to count the ticks in the next minute. At noon, it will report the number on a display that only I can see. If that number is odd, I will raise my right hand. If it is even, I raise my left hand. The uncertainties implied by quantum mechanics make it impossible for you to predict in advance which hand I will raise.

    Ah, but you say, that’s not evidence of free will! You might assert that your knowledge of the state of my brain and the universe would have allowed you to come up with the scheme I would use to decide which hand to raise. You’d probably pull your hair out in frustration that I was playing word games and not demonstrating free will.

    Well, my point is that YOU have chosen two definitions and laid them out as if they were the only options. You DEFINE absolute free will as something that exists outside of physical causality and then (circularly) conclude that it is impossible because it is outside of physical causality. You then define practical free will as what we perceive even if it is not what is ACTUALLY happening. You say: “What else can be gained by attaining absolute free will? Will it not feel identical anyway, and will it not result in essentially the same outcomes?” Daniel, if we can’t distinguish between absolute and practical free will using any scientific experiment, then they are not different scientific concepts. I suggested a third definition of free will – one that I suspected you would claim required some sort of “yet unknown element of physical law that provides for the unpredictability of human choice.” You don’t have to accept that definition of free will (I’m not sure I do – I laid it out mostly as a prelude to the scenario in this response), but at the very least, you should acknowledge that I can take an action that is unpredictable (even in principle), and you should not let anyone get away with an argument that asserts that a “complete” knowledge of the state of the universe and the laws that govern it would imply that all actions of an individual are predictable.

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    First of all, you continue to bring up the concepts of hard determinism as if my argument against absolute free will depends on it, and you continue to raise the possibility of quantum randomness as potentially damaging evidence to my proposition.

    I say again, randomness offers gives nothing to free will. Nothing. All it offers is the inability to predict outcomes, which means it counters hard determinism. Once again–hard determinism is not required to disbelieve in free will.

    The key to free will does not lie in our ability to predict things, but rather for humans to be able to make choices independently of causality. I accept your other proposed definition as well, as I think it's much the same thing: that you can have knowledge of the previous state as well as all laws governing the universe, and still be unable to make a prediction.

    There is a caveat here, however, being that if we know all the rules, and one of the rules is randomness, then we would know that we'd be unable to predict the outcome.

    But one final time–that randomness would be coming from the subatomic level, not from the human decision point. To believe that the unpredictability happens solely as a function of conscious decisions is an outrageous proposition that requires evidence. You don't need evidence to show it isn't true, but rather to show that it is (see leprechauns).

    As for your other claim that you can't distinguish between scientific concepts unless you can use scientific experiment, you're doing something there that's been covered by Bertrand Russell with his teapot argument. Briefly, I can make a claim that a teapot orbits the sun near Mars that's too small to be detected by any instrument. My claim that this is probably bullshit is not unscientific.

    In summary, your entire argument seems to perch on randomness countering predictability. I've accepted that since point 1 of my very first post on this topic. It's well travelled.

    Yes, randomness destroys hard determinism, but it does nothing for free will.

    So, let's make sure we're not already agreeing. My argument against absolute free will is in the context of moral repercussions, meaning the main thing I think we get from accepting it is that we are not responsible for our station in life, and that because of this we should feel responsible to help each other when we suffer. This includes accepting that those who thrive aren't OWED their spoils, but rather should use them as instruments to help others.

    All of this because absolute free will doesn't exist, meaning that in the perspective of the universe (not of us and our lives) we have nothing to do with what level of education we reach or how much money we make, or how good we are at parenting, or how inclined we are to be drug users, etc.

    They key is not that all these things are predetermined, but that they aren't in our control. That's a crucial difference. You don't need randomness for free will, you need human control over the universe.

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    How about this for a simplification: There are two levers for controlling outcomes in the universe:

    1. Control the previous state over the universe.
    2. Control the laws that govern the universe.

    If you do not have any control over either of these then you cannot control any subsequent states of the universe.

    And if you claim to have control over a previous state of the universe, when did that control begin? You didn't always exist, and when you did not you had no level of control.

    So at what point after your birth did you gain control over a previous state of the universe? If that never happened then any perception of control is, necessarily, illusory.

  • cooperati

    Free will does not exclusively rely on ability.

    One can have an intent, without capacity.

    Control over the entire universe is an impossible qualifier.

    Control over the universe before our existence is another impossible qualifier.

    But I can choose to drop a hammer. Or not. And pick it up, or not.

    If the hammer has to be meta-physical to prove I have free will, then you win.

    But you don't win. Because I can still choose to drop the hammer and pick it up.

    Free will is established inbetween the creation of intent and the beginning of an intended action, and also passively at the beginning of an intended inaction, or the attempt at either with the accepted premise that the action or inaction can or might be completed by that person or group.

    Now simply defined:

    “free will (n.)

    “1. The ability or discretion to choose; free choice: chose to remain behind of my own free will.

    “2. The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.”

    http://www.thefreedictionary.com/free+will

    It seems obvious that you are choosing only one context, and stating that the other is impossible.

    How ironic.

    -=T=-

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    You are very late to the game here. Saying you have free will because you can choose to pick up a hammer is just about the most sophomoric thing possible. It's literally a fourth-grader argument.

    Using that logic I can prove that Thor exists because I feel his power inside me.

    I suggest you read the Stanford and Wikipedia pages on free will so you can see the foundation we all started from. If it were as easy as you just tried to make it the topic wouldn't have been a debate for the last couple thousand years.

  • cooperati

    Are you intentionally, or accidentally, jumping over the evidence?

    You apparently can't see the forest for the trees. ( http://esl.about.com/library/glossary/bldef_130… )

    I can choose to drop a hammer, and not pick it up. Despite the fact that this is a complex chemical and physical function, limited by the constraints imposed by the laws that govern our universe, this is still a thing I can do, or not do, based on my desire.

    Oh, desire doesn't exist either? Then what is it, beyond observable and quantifiable?

    And, I've read the articles you've cited. They escalate well above what interests me, the evidence.

    So, if I state the evidence for proof of free will, I hope your best response isn't just to call it “primitive”. Calling the questions I make that address the holes in the argument that you bring such things as “sophomoric” and “fourth grader” doesn't make them any less relevant.

    It's below you to neglect the challenge provided by empirical proof.

    “free will (n.)

    “1. The ability or discretion to choose”

    I choose with my brain, hence I have free will.

    If I'm writing with my hand, is it not writing because I need to use an appendage from outside our universe? Likewise, if I'm choosing, is it not free will because my deciding process must include elements originating outside our physical reality?

    -=T=-

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    You're confusing absolute and practical free will.

  • cooperati

    Is the difference that one, absolute, can't exist, while the other one, practical, does?

    By the definitions you impose, I must agree, but they are not universally accepted terms.

    What you call “practical free will” others simply call “free will”. What you call “absolute free will” others also call “free will”. How you divide them by implied characteristics, one having a supernatural source, and the other not, is not accepted in the general debate over the existence of free will.

    And, by dividing this into two categories thusly, you establish how both arguments are correct, does/does not exist.

    By your terms, practical free will does exist. I do not concern myself with any other, most specifically, what I can call, by way of your terminology, impractical free will.

    -=T=-

  • CarlM

    Daniel,

    Perhaps I made too many points in my last post. Let me summarize:

    (1) If there is no way to distinguish between “Absolute” and “Practical” free will using a scientific experiment, then they are NOT different scientific concepts.

    You can argue all you want that they are not the same thing and that one is an illusion while the other is real, but this is not science. This is analogous to the several scientifically equivalent interpretations of quantum theory (including the many-worlds theory that is so popular in science fiction). Science doesn't distinguish among them. They are essentially equivalent from the eyes of science. Which interpretation of quantum theory someone chooses to “believe” (if any) is a matter of philosophy rather than science. The same is true for your two “different” definitions of free will. Once again, if there is no way to distinguish between them using a scientific experiment, then they are equivalent in the eyes of science. I don't see any scientific reason to choose one. If science has nothing to say on the topic, then in my opinion, there's no reason to make a choice. (In any case, such a choice is not a SCIENTIFIC one.)

    This is NOT the same as the claim that there is a tiny teapot in orbit somewhere in the solar system. While there may be no way to prove or disprove this from our vantage point on Earth, there IS a way to prove it true (go find the teapot). Furthermore, at least in principle, there is a way to prove it false (make a complete and systematic search of the solar system – far fetched perhaps, but certainly possible in principle). In the case of distinguishing between your two versions of free will, I’ve heard nothing from you about how one could IN PRINCIPLE distinguish between them using a scientific experiment or a set of observations.

    (2) The point of my scenario was not to prove that there is free will of one type or another. I was attacking your argument (by now you should be able to spot when I am doing this). You defined free will and then used the particulars of your definition to arrive at some conclusions. I defined free will in terms of unpredictability and waited for you to assert that my definition would REQUIRE some “yet unknown element of physical law”. I then demonstrated that you were wrong. It wasn’t fair of course. I laid the trap within my definition (just as you did in yours by asserting in the definition that free will requires something outside of physical law). The point of the scenario was to show that ANY ARGUMENT THAT ASSERTS THAT KNOWLEDGE OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE LAWS THAT GOVERN IT IS SUFFICIENT TO PREDICT THE ACTIONS OF AN INDIVIDUAL IS FALLACIOUS.

    I would argue that if our actions are unpredictable (as I have demonstrated they are), then it would be difficult (perhaps impossible) to come up with a scientific test that could (even in principle) disprove the existence of free will. It seems to me that this removes free will from the domain of science.

    –

    Daniel, as I have told you many times, I neither believe nor disbelieve in free will. You think that this is due to some wishy-washy nature on my part. While it is true that I see no reason to come down on one side or another of an argument that is lacking in evidence one way or the other, I am happy to discuss philosophy. I simply don’t confuse this with “truth.” You are tying this to the fact that I label myself as an agnostic (which seems to trouble you far more than it should). In fact, you are right, there is a link between the two situations, but you have misidentified what it is. They are BOTH purely semantic arguments. You are trying to define the truth-value of a concept when the concept itself it not properly defined. If you ask me whether I believe in free will, I see a meaningless question (free will is not a well-defined concept). If you ask me whether I believe in any observable thing that requires something outside of physical law (including any as-yet-unknown physical law), then I can respond that I do not. When you go on to assert that this means that there can be no free will, I can only look at your definition of “absolute free will” and say “By THAT definition, you’re right of course,” but I will not change my position of not having a position on “free will” because yours is not the only definition of free will. Indeed, unless someone can provide a scientific definition of free will that (in principle) allows for empirical evidence to be brought to bear to prove or disprove its existence, I don’t think that it falls within the realm of science. It is pure philosophy. (Not that pure philosophical discussions don’t have their place, but once again, let’s not confuse a philosophical position with “truth.”) You yourself have given two different definitions of free will and have (apparently) admitted that there’s no way to distinguish between them using empirical evidence (if I’m wrong about this, then you need to tell me the method you have of distinguishing between them). My philosophy on ducks is: if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then unless there’s some way to tell that it’s not a duck, it’s a duck, so … if you want to know my philosophical position on free will, I can tell you that I see no reason to disbelieve in its existence. (I’ve read your simplified argument and do not find it sufficiently philosophically compelling.)

  • CarlM

    While I was crafting my response (tough to find the time with a weekend visitor) you guys have carried the argument forward. I apologize for repeating some of what cooperati has stated here, but perhaps it will be helpful for you, Daniel, to see similar arguments presented in somewhat different ways.

  • cooperati

    “My philosophy on ducks is: if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then unless there’s some way to tell that it’s not a duck, it’s a duck, so …”

    Oh so tried and true. I love it.

    -=T=-

  • CarlM

    Daniel,

    Quite apart from the discussion on free will, only an imbecile would suggest that everyone has an equal opportunity for success or that the circumstances in which people find themselves don't have an impact on their actions and their success in life. If you want people to stop holding others entirely to blame for the circumstances in which they find themselves, then say so. If that's your point, then you don't need to waste the energy trying to convert everyone to your philosophical position on free will. Focus on your point.

    Since I'm pretty sure that your acceptance of “practical” free will means that you accept the notion of some sort of punishment and reward system in society to keep the machine running smoothly, I'm not sure what benefit you gain by worrying about the extent to which free will is “real.”

  • CarlM

    “If it were as easy as you just tried to make it the topic wouldn't have been a debate for the last couple thousand years.”

    lol … right back at ya!

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    Because “real” matters. Not right now, because we're too unevolved to take any action based on real. But it's good to know anyway.

  • CarlM

    I disagree. Indeed, I would argue that “real” does NOT matter if multiple possibilities of what is “real”are not distinguishable by any observation we can possibly make.

    I thought you'd understand why I put “real” in quotes.

  • Shenpen

    I do not understand your argument. Punishment, derision etc. are based on practical free will: 1) individuals are able not to commit crimes if they want to (practical free will), 2) and making it costly to commit crimes might make them less likely to want to. I know 2) doesn't follow from 1) and requires some evidence, but this is now irrelevant because it's not a question of free will but a complex psychological problem about how exactly intrinsic and extrinsic motivation works, which is a different topic.

    All the right-wing vs. left-wing issues you mentioned are based on practical free will on the right-wing side, not an absolute free will, in fact, why should absolute free will be have to do anything with political decisions which are practical?

    Well actually I do understand your argument, in way, but that way would be a very ridiculous way. The clue is “a society to be built”. Well a society isn't built, it grows, organically. People never ever managed to “redesign” a society, not even the Bolsheviks managed to do so. People can only exert influence on which direction will a society grow.

    Basically, if I get you right, your argument is based on the tacit assumption that political institutions need not only be practical and effective (i.e. based on practical free will), but also need to be justified i.e. decided if the “building” complies to a given absolute standard or not.

    But if we don't agree a society is something to be designed or built, then it follows that “justification” or complying with some absolute standard is not necessary.

    Thus, when talking about whether people “deserve” to be rich or poor it shouldn't mean that whether this state of things complies with some sort of absolute blueprint or not. The question is much more practical than that: does this situation cause more good and less harm to society as a whole than the known measures against it f.e. redistribution? This is the only important question and it can be resolved on a basis of practical arguments like practical free will, it doesn't require “cosmic” arguments like absolute free will.

    So basically unless one thinks a society is something to be designed, absolute free will is irrelevant.

    Right-wingers, at least the ones I like, tend to be right-wingers not because they have a deep faith in absolute free will but because they do not believe a society is something to be designed, thus, they don't believe it has to comply with any cosmic blueprint.

    Finally, please do not use the word “compassion” because you clearly don't understand what it means. Compassion doesn't means giving to the deserving. That's called justice f.e. paying wages and debts etc. Compassion means giving exactly to the undeserving. Compassion means giving DESPITE that the recipient is undeserving. Thus compassion not only requires a certain level of believing in some kind of free will, either practical or absolute, it REQUIRES it or it's not compassion, but justice.

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    You had some interesting points up until you tried to tell me I didn't know
    what compassion means. I suggest using a dictionary:
    http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/compassion…
    <http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/compassion… pity
    and concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others.”

    We have to go off of what most people think words mean, not what you and a
    few others think it means. The definition above, I'd argue, is what most
    people in the english-speaking world think of when they think of compassion.

    Onto your point, I think my argument is that it's understandable to
    practically blame the criminal for doing what he did, or to claim some sort
    of credit for being successful in life. I recognize that this behavior is
    what makes society work.

    But this doesn't make it true, and that's where the “absolute” distinction
    comes in. If I am successful out of pure chance, and the guy next to me is a
    criminal and a bum out of pure chance, then I would argue that it's my
    responsibility to help that person (and society's responsibility to
    generally have the successful help the unsuccessful).

    This flows naturally from reason and compassion, given an understanding of
    the universe that says all stations in life were attained by pure chance.

    Do you see where I'm going with this?

  • Shenpen

    I think I do see but I have problem with it.

    First, the dictionary definition blurs the important separation between justice (deserved) and charity (undeserved). The point I want to make that undeserved help is something that clearly exists, the deserve-problem doesn't prevent charity and in fact if you look at it historically, compassion outside the field of the immediate family were invented by Buddhism and Christianity and neither did chalk one's status in life to “pure chance”.

    Why is it important? Because compassion is only one half of getting something done. The other half is understanding the situation correctly, the general causalities. I mean, given that practical free will exists, help will not work in all cases, not even in most cases, in make cases, will cause more harm.

    That's the whole point of practical free will, actually. I don't know what your theory of human nature is – are we naturally good, are we born in blank states, do you believe in evolutionary-genetically coded morality or original sin, or karma, or anything else, but there is only one kind of theory of human nature where a help-only attitude would work: if we would assume human nature is damn good that any kind of distortion must be temporary and will last only until the conditions last, thus, anybody given sufficient help will become good. This is so optimistic that it was never a popular view.

    Even in the historically most optimistic view on human nature, the Rousseauian view, which says we are all born good but society makes us bad, a help-only approach isn't promised to work because even if people are born good the general habits acquired under bad conditions would cause it not to work i.e. once crime becomes a habit, help will be seen as a reward and thus reinforce it.

    And of course in all other theories of human nature, which are more pessimistic, it's even worse.

    So basically the optimal way of getting something done would be to have compassion but yet be perfectly clear about the practical free will aspects i.e. being clear how high % of one's misery is self-caused in the practical sense and try to do something about that, which could range from persuasion to punishment.

    BTW. It's clear to me you are using the free will problem to lay the foundations of a basically progressive political philosophy. Now, I'm a conservative of a secular-skeptical subtype but I think the real difference lays not in the free will problem – let me give you an advice. To truly lay down the foundations of a political philosophy the core question to address is not free will but human nature i.e. the source of good and evil. Are we born good, or are we born with a blank state, or is there something like original sin or karma etc. etc. etc. etc. This is really where it all should begin because only then can you answer the crucial question that how will people probably behave if they get enough help.

    There are 5 major theories of human nature:

    1. We are all born good but society turns us bad – Rousseau, generally considered a left-wing view.

    2. We are all born in a blank state and can learn anything, based on our influences. This is considered the “whig” view and generally correlates with Classical Liberalism.

    3. We can learn much, but there are certain biological leanings, the brain is a special-purpose computer and not a general-purpose one – the evolutionary psychology view.

    4. We all have a built-in potential for both good and bad and must choose, and these forces are roughly equal in power in us, i.e. it's equally easy or hard to choose one or the other – this is considered the “lighter” form of the traditional view, shared, although in a different vocabulary, by Christianity and Buddhism.

    5. We all have a built-in potential for both good and bad but the bad is heavier, it drags us down, even if we just want to stay in one place we must still struggle for the good or slowly slide down. This is considered the “harder” traditional view, again shared, albeit again in a different vocabulary, by Christianity and Buddhism.

    I'm conservative because I'm hovering between 4 and 5. Not quite sure yet. It's largely based on my life experience f.e. observing friends raising children, and reading lots of history – f.e. Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem explains how maddeningly easy is for a perfectly normal person to become totally evil etc. etc. generally based on these and similar experiences.

    I know you won't agree but the purpose here is just to convince you to lay down a foundation of a theory of human nature and build your political philosophy on top of it because it's not really possible to make it solid otherwise. For example, the first question to address is that what makes not particularly bright nor educated people want the good, if and when they do want so. Free will or determinism comes only after it – that's something to be built on top of it.

  • Shenpen

    BTW do you have any evidence that a belief in absolute free will does indeed cause a serious reduction of charitability? Who are the actual absolute-freewillists around where you live? The Fundies, or some other type? Are they really against charity? Insofar I know they give significant amounts of private charity and are not totally opposed to the idea of tax-based charity, just want somewhat less or done differently. As far as I've heard their real problem with most state social programs is that it's too impersonal and doesn't couple the education and the incentive with the financial help as the personal, private kind of charity does. This seems like a realistic take to me, even with a very optimistic theory of human nature we should see habits are hard to break. So it doesn't really sound like a big problem to me, insofar as I know, in practical life, absolute-freewillism correlates with somewhat less charitable giving but done more efficiently, wrapped in a complex life-changing package, I don't really have a big problem with it, it's problem more bang for the buck, I don't think it must be a big problem. Can you investigate it empirically? Choose a very Fundie county or something and check out the levels of private and public charity or something?

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    Wow.

    I disagree with most of what you have said here, but I am simultaneously giddy about continuing the conversation. I shall start another thread to do so if you are so inclined to participate.

  • http://danielmiessler.com/ Daniel Miessler

    My evidence, sadly, but understandably, is anecdotal. But I have made an effort to seek out larger groups to test it with.

    It basically goes like this: those who are adamant about, “get your hands off my money!” are the same exact ones who believe most in personal choice to fail (and succeed).

    This feeling is inversely proportional to feelings of being willing to give some of what they have to help others.

    I believe we can draw a straight line from the indoctrinated belief in god-given free will to the belief that suffering is deserved.

    Absolute free will is, therefore, an antidote for this. I would not try to force it into this mold, mind you, if I didn't believe it were philosophically compelling.

  • cooperati

    “BTW. It's clear to me you are using the free will problem to lay the foundations of a basically progressive political philosophy.”

    On the nose!

    -=T=-

  • richardcorsale

    @CarlM : Free will is a farce, I see that now.. for example.. you said “This will be my only reply to this post” however look at this thread, it's like the Encyclopaedia Romania.

    You never had a chance :)

  • CarlM

    Yeah, I know … it's pretty good proof. lol

  • http://maxolasersquad.com/ Maxolasersquad

    It took me a while to get around to reading this one, but I'd like to state two objections, the latter being fundamental to your point.
    First, I think you interchange religious and Christian too much. Being religious does not imply any specific belief other than a general idea of something “greater” than our being. You also keep insisting that free will vs. determinism is part of being religious. I have demonstrated to you multiple times that many protestant Christians absolutely do not believe in free will based on biblical texts. Atheists do not have a monopoly on determinism and theists do not have a monopoly on free will. Different views of different religions yield different outcomes of the free will vs determinism debate. I'm not sure why you keep ignoring this.
    Second, the logical conclusions of free will is not that of apathy to those in distress. Equally so, the logical conclusion of determinism is not sympathy. You keep making the claim that these two lines of thoughts leads to these conclusion with absolutely no explanation as to why they have they should have these conclusions.
    This line of reasoning is even more fuzzy than the leap from understanding evolution to enacting Social Darwinism. It simply doesn't work that way and you don't provide a line of reasoning to establish why you believe it should.

  • http://maxolasersquad.com/ Maxolasersquad

    It took me a while to get around to reading this one, but I'd like to state two objections, the latter being fundamental to your point.
    First, I think you interchange religious and Christian too much. Being religious does not imply any specific belief other than a general idea of something “greater” than our being. You also keep insisting that free will vs. determinism is part of being religious. I have demonstrated to you multiple times that many protestant Christians absolutely do not believe in free will based on biblical texts. Atheists do not have a monopoly on determinism and theists do not have a monopoly on free will. Different views of different religions yield different outcomes of the free will vs determinism debate. I'm not sure why you keep ignoring this.
    Second, the logical conclusions of free will is not that of apathy to those in distress. Equally so, the logical conclusion of determinism is not sympathy. You keep making the claim that these two lines of thoughts leads to these conclusion with absolutely no explanation as to why they have they should have these conclusions.
    This line of reasoning is even more fuzzy than the leap from understanding evolution to enacting Social Darwinism. It simply doesn't work that way and you don't provide a line of reasoning to establish why you believe it should.

  • An_observer

    If we cannot influence our acceptance of an idea and the shape of our future belief structure and conception of reality then how can we “accept” that absolute free will is false? There is nothing to do to accept it or not accept it. If it will happen it will happen – the chain of events that led / will lead to our acceptance of it were set into motion at the birth of the universe and there is nothing you or I can do to alter that (though we may indulge in the illusion that there is and enjoy the delusional feeling of control that it gives us).

    Which begs the question, what was the point of your article? Surely you weren’t trying to affect the state of the universe in some way..

  • Anonymous 

                    Many women around the world use hair straighteners <A href="http://www.ghdnote.com/">ghd</A> to help style your hair in the morning or before leaving the house. hair straighteners are a great invention that has allowed us to style our hair to a high standard of living in double quick time. These smoothing tools have evolved in terms of technological standards and have become the best doing their job. In the past, hair straighteners went wrong and, consequently, could cause damage to the hair shaft. The extreme heat had all the moisture and brings it to breakage and damage. <A href="http://www.ghdnote.com/">ghd Hair Straighteners</A> As I said before, GHD IV MK4 Black are much better now and are less likely to damage the hair. However, it is necessary to take into account any extreme heat can be bad. To combat this, please make sure you use a good quality heat protection spray. Heat protection sprays come in a variety of ways. You can get smoothing protection products as aerosols, creams and lotions. While it may be different in terms of texture and appearance, they all have a common property that is to add moisture and keep the hairs natural moisture and provide UV protection from the heat of hair styling tools. By using these products, should always follow the product instructions, but as a general function should never overload your hair with too much product. Since this can leave the hair feeling very sticky and can weigh hair down and real style that you are trying to achieve unattractive. And GHD Hair Straightener have advanced in performance, so have the products for protection against heat. Now, not only <A href="http://www.ghdnote.com/">ghd IV styler</A>

    protect your hair, but also have design capabilities. You can add volume, body and texture to keep the hair and help you get the look you really want to have and also make your hair look healthy and shiny, softer feel and become much stronger. Let’s summarize it all. hair straighteners are expensive – 鈧?80. We spend a lot of money at the hairdressers – 20 + for a cut or 60 for a cut and color. If we are willing to spend so much on the fundamentals of our hair, we also have to spend an extra 5 – 15 in a spray to protect the good quality of heat. For best results, try to use the proceeds of protection every time you straighten or blow dries your hair.


Top

Popular

Information Security / Technology

Politics

Philosophy & Religion

Technology & Science

Culture & Society

Miscellaneous

Arguments

Projects

Collections

Twitter

What I'm Reading

Favorite Books and Essays

Top Blog Categories

Inputs