A Simplified Argument Against Free Will

What I don't understand is why would you need to argue or debate a deterministic view at all? It seems extremely redundant.

He does it because he must. :-)

It's actually an addicting point of view. I once wrote a 32 page essay on determinism in high school. (I got an A on it.)

I don't know if Daniel had Mr. Halford in Senior year.

-=T=-

Suppose your choice is one of those variables. It cannot be part of the past state, but must be taken into account by the laws that determine one state from the next.

These Laws of the universe must take all the decisions from people and perform them as according to the physical laws. This would be in addition to the past state. It's more information.

You're assuming those laws take into account only the past state - and therefore are assuming that free will does not exist. (As there is no place for it,) This is begging the question.

Hi, Name. I had addressed this in the original version of my argument but removed the explanation in the interest of simplicity.

Your point doesn't work for a couple of reasons:

1. humans arrived on a scene in which they had no control over the past state of the universe. So you must explain how the first person gained control over the state of the universe.

2. even if one person had control over the state of the universe and actually made a change and thus had an effect, this would not automatically trickle forward into free will for all future humans. Their change would actually just blend into all the other past-state variables for future humans, and it would again become necessary for each person to be able to pull that lever for themselves.

Thanks for posting, though. It was a point that had to be raised.

I have appended a formal answer to your question to the post. Thanks again for the comment.

Then what am I doing?

The ability to predict outcomes has little to do with whether free will exists. In other words, the key is not whether the future state of the universe is determined, but rather whether or not we're able to modify the past-state.

Is it Non-free will? Slave will? Robotic mechanical reaction? Absolute determinism?

What picks out what I eat for breakfast?

When I'm looking at poptarts, raisin bran, and old pizza, what, if not free will, picks out, on a conscious level, the food I am going to eat?

-=T=-

Sorry to be forward here, but you have much reading to do before you can participate in this conversation. You're like a thousand years behind in the debate. I suggest you read the Stanford and Wikipedia pages on the topic to get caught up.

"you have much reading to do before you can participate in this conversation" ... and he didn't pay the participation entrance fee either. :)

He's a best bud from high school. There's history. :)

I know, but it just seemed so out of character. (Trust me I know how you feel. I've got students who come with questions about Chapter 8 when I can see that they don't yet understand Chapter 4.)

Then too, I think that the fact that a fourth grader can make an argument in favor of free will does not mean that it isn't a good argument.

I'd like to quote a friend of mine. He dabbles a bit in philosophy and recently wrote: "If it were as easy as you just tried to make it the topic wouldn't have been a debate for the last couple thousand years." You might take this to heart, Daniel.

I do take it to heart. And I'm waiting for an explanation. I see none in the Stanford article.

The only escape I see from my definition and argument is to use a different definition, which is fine. Just don't confuse the two (practical and absolute).

My comments to cooperati are out of character because he, unlike most others, can actually make me angry.

sorry 'bout that! ;)

i just read (parts of) the stanford article on compatabilism (which is very good - one of the best articles i've read there, and a surprisingly easy read). and as far as i can see you've duplicated the "rough, non-technical sketch" of the consequence argument from section 4.1.

now you just blew this guy off, saying he should read the arguments at stanford before posting here. but if he does that it seems to me he's way past you anyway (since the article continues quite some way past section 4.1).

so what's the game? is the idea that we toss small technical objections at about the level of the presentation so that you can bat them away in the hope of impressing someone? or is there something more interesting that i'm missing?

(and cooperati's approach doesn't seem that daft to me. there's an established analytical tradition - rooted, perhaps, in moore's common-sensical hand-waving - that no matter how nice the technical case, you have to answer the obvious appeal to intuition...)

My apologies to you and other readers for my comments to cooperati. He's a very close friend of mine, from high school, so our interactions have context. :)

No need to be sorry, as I can be forward in return.

The basic argument that free will exists is that it is perceived. No more platitudes are required.

Thank you for your assessment, but it seems you are withdrawing from the question on the basis of it's merits.

I offer you another chance to answer it.

-=T=-

If a feeling were all that were required then witchcraft is also real.

Litmus reactions were considered witchcraft, before it was accepted as a reaction based on acidic/basic determination, or ph reaction. (In fact, this was one of the things that brought a science to witchcraft. At one point, the two were not mutually exclusive. I tend to look at it that one evolved into the other.)

Science is based on observable and repeatable things or reactions. Choice, and desire, is observable, repeatable, and even quantifiable.

Given those, and the hypothesis that free will is or isn't, one must conclude that free will, which depends on the action of choice, exists.

-=T=-

"Choice, and desire, is observable, repeatable, and even quantifiable."

Choice in the sense of "free" choice is not observable. By definition it disobeys quantitative physics, and the causality of particulate interactions.

Choice is our concept of what is ostensibly the result of our conscious reaction to external stimuli. This doesn't implicate free will. It upsets me when people use arguments like yours: "What chose my breakfast if not me!?" Are you denying that you are composed of cells? Molecules? You can't possibly assume that there is some transcendent force at play in YOU, the passing phenomena of a perceptively limited homo sapien. Anthropocentrism incarnate.

OP: My classmates and I had a heated argument last week in Philosophy along these lines. Strange that I stumbled upon this post of yours; your thoughts suit my position perfectly. ^_^

IIRC, you're arguing that the sensation of "choice" is evidence of a pivotal change in the course of human events. In other words, a sensation of decision is supposed to mean that the human consciousness is a unique causative agent that cannot be completely predicted by external factors. This seems like a leap to me. Not necessarily impossible, but still a leap. Feel free to rephrase my words if you feel I've misunderstood you.

I'm not very well versed in this, but a counter-argument to your prima facie approach would be that humans can make "choices," however our choice is 100% guided by preexisting factors over which we have no control. Your argument seems to be that the sensation of choice *represents* control, but I don't see why it does. Like all sensations, it just represents chemical processes in the brain, which are, like everything else, determined by physical events over which we have no real control. I would add the sensation of decision would seem necessary in order for conscious entities to want to live. It could be that our sense of decision is an inevitable product of natural selection. My background is in bio, not philosophy, so this is my instinct here.

"... however our choice is 100% guided by preexisting factors over which we have no control." Well, I will say this for that argument. It's very Daniel-like. It assumes the conclusion quite nicely.

It would be helpful to define precisely what you mean by "free will", and which aspect(s) of it you are attempting to debunk. This includes the context.

The assertion that, aside from changing the laws of the universe, the only way to manifest free will is to change the prior state needs further support. The obvious objection is that all that is necessary is to have access to alternatives in a way that neither "fork" is determined by the previous state, i.e. the capacity for first cause.

Within the context of my consciousness, which includes any and all conclusions and future actions I may take based on the outcome of the question, my consciousness is first cause of my decisions. Whether or not consciousness is truly first cause in a broader, metaphysical context is irrelevant. There is no conclusion about morals, ethics, politics, or anything to do with my behavior that would change (nor could they under absolute determinism), since it is all subsumed under the context in which perceived free will is fact.

Examining that broader context is certainly interesting, but I'm happy to leave it as unknown pending further advances. I suspect that, should we ever figure it out, it will turn out to be possible within the laws of the universe for consciousness to be first cause, though I honestly can't see how at this point, aside from a couple of very vague potential mathematical "loopholes" that aren't well-defined enough to even begin arguing over in detail.

The practical applicability of the full-context question is mostly in the field of attempts to create consciousness on silicon or other non-biological substrates (AI), and not really at all in any field of morals, ethics, etc.

The definition here, and at Stanford's page as well I'd argue, is that the individual is the first cause for an event rather than an exterior actor or actors. Another way of saying this is that an individual is able to make a decision apart from physical causality consisting of the universe's previous state combined with the laws that govern the transition from that state to the next.

That's what I assume is meant whenever the term is used without further definition. So, given that proposition - consciousness can be first cause - isn't the requirement that the past be changed assuming the conclusion that the proposition is false? And if the proposition is broadened slightly to "the laws of the universe allow for such first causes", doesn't the same objection apply to your second premise?

I happen to believe that changing the past-state of the universe, and the laws of physics, is impossible for humans. But I'm not sure I'm begging the question or assuming the conclusion. Those are different.

I'm laying out what seems to be a perfectly logical argument regarding past-state becoming future-state, with the help of the laws of physics.

I don't see any strange conclusions being drawn there that I am assuming in my argument.

@Kyle: Yes, he assumes the conclusion.

@Daniel: Kyle's making a good point here .. don't brush it away as quickly as you are tempted to do.

You assert that the PREVIOUS state of the universe must be changed. That's a rather odd assertion. It seems CLEAR that to change the previous state of the universe, you'd have to change an even earlier state, etc. Of course nobody will follow this line of infinite regress. (In any case, I don't think many people are arguing that to make a choice they must change a PAST state of the universe.)

Your alternative is that the laws that govern the universe must be changed. WOW. That's a lot to ask of someone who is just trying to make an arbitrary (but free) decision. I can't imagine that anyone will argue that they change the laws of the universe every time that they decide what to get on their pizza.

Perhaps your assertion that these are the only two possibilities is faulty.

PS I agree with stringerbell's reaction from Reddit.

I am making an argument that these are the only two possibilities for free will without invoking the supernatural.

I ask anyone to offer a viable alternative, i.e. to explain a way in which one can be acting independently if they didn't have a say in the conditions that brought them to this point, nor over the laws that will govern the progression to the next step.

Give me an option. Show me a way. Explain why this is not logical. Provide an alternative.

I've received numerous comments here and the best I've seen so far is the assertion that my argument is philosophical and not scientific because it's not falsifiable.

I'll try and address that excellent point in the future, but for now I would like to see ANY alternative to the argument I've put forth.

P.S. as for your comment about this not being an argument, please see above. I think the argument is quite clear.

"I am making an argument that these are the only two possibilities for free will without invoking the supernatural."

No you're not. You're making an assertion. They are the premises of your "argument", not a conclusion. It's no different than creationists saying the bible is infallible and quoting a bible verse to prove it.

Here's the alternative: the laws of the universe allow the possibility of first cause. True or not, it remains entirely unaddressed by your "argument". Your argument is, literally: that's false because you'd have to violate or change the laws of the universe to do that.

Hmm. I think you're right. I'll have to re-evaluate and see if I can
make a more formal, and careful, attempt.

Many thanks for the comments.

Apparently I no longer need to write the post I was getting ready to write. :-)

"I'll have to re-evaluate"

Much respect for that.

Kyle, though Daniel is a tad stubborn at times (a quality that I share and consider a good one), he is pretty good at admitting when he realizes that his arguments are flawed. I too respect this in him.

For the record, I take causality as axiomatic and reject utterly the supernatural. On the other hand, existence exists, which would seem to contradict causality, allow for first cause, in at least one singular case. It would indicate that either our understanding of what causality is is flawed, or our understanding of "first", or notions of time such as "before", are flawed. I don't know if that translates into an allowance for consciousness being first cause, but I cannot rule it out, particularly in light of our perception of free will. But as I said earlier, it is a question with absolutely zero consequence for our own actions and choices, whether those choices be real or illusory.

Daniel, let me borrow a few of Kyle's words that clearly and calmly capture my position on the science of free will (whatever that is). (I've edited this slightly.)

"... I'm happy to leave it as unknown pending further advances. I suspect that, should we ever figure it out, it [may] turn out to be possible within the laws of the universe for consciousness to be first cause, though I honestly can't see how at this point ..."

Daniel, I think that once you've cleaned up your circluar arguments, what remains will boil down to something like this: "Since nobody seems able to explain HOW current physical law would allow consciousness to inject freely-chosen willful action into the universe, it must be impossible." This seems to be the core of your argument (you keep asking HOW free choice is possible given our understanding of physics). My position is that you are far too quick to dismiss things as impossible. You told cooperati to go do some reading before taking part in the conversation. I might tell you to do the same (though I don't have a specific set of readings to suggest). The history of science (and of the world) is full of those who claimed that particular things could have no natural explanation (thus concluding that they were either supernatural or illusion) ... only to be proven wrong. Sometimes what proved them wrong was the development of new physical theories, but other times it took only a more imaginative application of existing theory. New consequences of existing physical theory are still coming out of the minds of physicists (and chemists and biologists and ...). The point is that unless physical theory EXCLUDES the possibility of free will (and except in the case of a purely deterministic world, free will has not been shown to be excluded from the theory), it is inappropriate to assert that it is scientifically impossible. You are (of course) free to take a philosophical stand on the issue, but you are confusing this philosophical stand with a scientific stand.

That's all separate from my other point. You've talked about "absolute free will" (which you define as being incompatible with physical theory) being incompatible with physical theory, but you've ALSO talked about "practical free will" as existing, but being "only" what we perceive (as opposed to being "real"). My position on this is that if you can't tell them apart through observation, then there is NO DIFFERENCE between the two (this is a philosophical position). If there is no way to distinguish between them, I believe they are equally real. Any difference you perceive is a philosophical one (and you're welcome to any philosophical position you choose).

"but you've ALSO talked about "practical free will" as existing, but being "only" what we perceive (as opposed to being "real")."

What I would like to say about this, perhaps expanding in a specific way, is that anything not within the realm of the physical universe, doesn't exist, and isn't real.

So, using "real" to relate to something meta-physical, whether it be on a higher order of conceptual magnitude (or lower), just doesn't seem right, and probably against the purpose of what is real.

In addition, this probably improper usage of "real" might better relate, include, imply, or replace "supernatural" as well as meta-physical.

Just an observation about what is "real" vs. what is real, from this conversation. Maybe this might need a more in depth definition, too, or refinement to mutually accepted terms. The impact on "practical" compared to "absolute" could, and likely should, be pivotal.

-=T=-

I think I understand what you're saying, but unless there is a way that "absolute" and "practical" free will can be distinguished from one another by observation (including whatever scientific experiments might be dreamt of by those with greater imaginations than mine) I don't see how we can talk about one being "real" and the other one not.

PS I think that a philosophical discussion on the topic of "what is real and why does it matter" would be quite interesting.

I realized that the following sentence might be misinterpreted: "If there is no way to distinguish between them, I believe they are equally real." Note that I'm not claiming that they are real. I'm claiming that it only makes sense (from my philosophical perspective) for either BOTH to be real or BOTH to be false (as long as they are indistinguishable from one another). Asserting that one is real while the other isn't makes no (philosophical) sense to me.

I know that I should give you a chance to respond before I elaborate, but I just found this quote in an article linked to on your blog:

"Every system has two sets of rules: The rules as they are intended or commonly perceived, and the actual rules ("reality"). In most complex systems, the gap between these two sets of rules is huge.

Sometimes we catch a glimpse of the truth, and discover the actual rules of a system. Once the actual rules are known, it may be possible to perform "miracles" -- things which violate the perceived rules."

The original is here: http://paulbuchheit.blogspot.com/2009/10/applie...

----

The point is that it is difficult to know which "miracles" are allowed by a sufficiently complex set of laws. This is a more elegant way of making the point I made about your being too quick to dismiss things as impossible.

Carl

PS There was a British writer who said something similar. I'll paraphrase: "There are more things in heaven and earth, Daniel, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

You're assuming that choice is based on cause and effect. You need to study quantum mechanics a bit more, then you'll realize that the universe isn't set in stone.

Free will is a limited affair. It seems rather like a choice in a tangle of superimposition. These incidentally are what we call future. "Predeterminism" is an unfortunate use of a concept more fitting for the past. Free will or determinism is a scholastic trap. The existent future is a superimposed collection of possibilities which in a sense are all there and when the choices are made the path from the present will seem to continue and limit or expand some of them

This entire argument necessitates that the causality we interpret in the world is necessarily correct.

Also quantum randomness cannot be simply waved away. The previous states of the universe according to a very strict interpretation of wave particle duality would be a product of the present state, that I exist and examine in this particular fashion. This idea is similar to biocentrism, that the particular state of my existence creates and necessitates the past that of which produces my current state.

And also, free will is a very silly term to use. It can never be true or complete free will, but there can be a level of indeterminably even in a determinable state.

I have a question. If the universe is in State "A" your idea suggesting it can ONLY flow into State "B" next (even though we can't predict what State "B" will be like). How can that be correct in a universe where there is uncertainty in it's rules? Here's another way to look at it. If you could rewind the universe back to state "A" then press play, would it definitely flow into State "B" again? The uncertain nature of the universe introduces a random factor which would means it could just as easily flow into state "F" instead. If you maintain it will always flow to State "B" next then the universe must be purely mechanical, and predicting the future is a possible, in theory at least. If you accept the random factor exists then so must free will. I would be very interested in your arguments against this.

Before you say it I know others have made much the same argument but you seem to skirt around the question by telling us the Random factor is irrelevant or an illusion. I think determinism boils down to what I call "Playing with words".

<quote:danielrm26>
Determinism is out of the picture. It's not relevant. We are not discussing predictability or anything of the sort. The issue is with whether or not we have *control* of the essential pieces that allow us to manipulate outcomes.</quote>

Ok yes, we are dealing with a constant stream of knock on effects, but self awareness allows us to choose what influences we take notice of. It's much harder to do than say but it is do-able.

It is pointless to think about changing the past but you can choose to starve or eat, Speed on the motorway or drive like your grandma, Buy a Mac or a PC. Each choice can be influenced but not not pre-determined 100% of the time. So, you can still make the choice and your future is not set. Free Will wins again!

You've basically argued that real (free) choice is possible because
you feel you've made choices in the past, and that it feels like
people make choices in general.

I suggest you read my latest essay on the topic, which captures both
your point and mine:

http://danielmiessler.com/blog/absolute-vs-prac...